The Representation of the People Bill is a major step forward for our democracy. It will give more young people a say, modernise our outdated registration system and strengthen rules around campaign finance. These are reforms the Electoral Reform Society has campaigned for over many years – important changes that will help make our elections fairer and remove barriers to voters participating.

It is important that the ambitions of this bill are secured in practice by ensuring that votes at 16 and a modernised registration system are delivered in time for the next General Election; that changes to the voter ID scheme help those most impacted and ensure that no eligible voter is prevented from voting in future; that political finance measures are robust enough; and that our elections regulator is independent of government and equipped to enforce the rules.

Part 1 – Young Voters

Extending the franchise is an opportunity to nurture more active citizens for the future. By giving 16- and 17-year-olds a vote we can engage the next generation in politics and improve the future health of our democracy.

Research has shown that the younger people are engaged in voting, the more likely they are to carry on voting later in their lives and that enfranchised 16- and 17-year-olds also tend to turnout to vote in greater numbers than those voting for the first time aged 18 and over.[1] This is likely because younger voters are better supported through their first experience of voting whilst they are at home and in education.

There is also some evidence to suggest that inequalities in participation are reduced. In Scotland, newly enfranchised young people of all social groups were equally likely to be politically engaged.[2] In Wales, gender gaps in perceived political knowledge (seen in all other age groups) were not present amongst 16- and 17-year-olds.[3]

Votes at 16 has potential to improve democratic participation for the future.

To ensure votes at 16 realises these positive democratic impacts it is vital that younger people are supported through democratic education. Democratic education can provide younger voters with the confidence, efficacy and interest to get involved at the same time as gaining the right to vote increases young people’s desire to learn about political issues.

It is also vital that modernisations to voter registration are made to ensure that young people (who are the least likely to be registered) do not miss out, and that they are supported with early awareness and information campaigns. Lessons from the introduction of votes at 16 in Wales show the importance of early interventions on awareness, registration and mobilisation.[4]

Automatic voter registration, improved voter engagement and democratic education can help make votes at 16 a major moment of democratic change and renewal in the UK.

Enfranchising 16- and 17-year-olds would not drastically change the electoral landscape[5] (evidence from around the world shows that young people have diverse attitudes, do not vote as a uniform bloc and do not change the broader political landscape) but it would allow young people to have a voice in the decisions that are made for them every day at local, regional and national level.

For more information on Votes at 16: https://electoral-reform.org.uk/latest-news-and-research/parliamentary-briefings/briefing-on-votes-at-16-2026/

Part 2 – Registration of Voters

Comprehensive and accurate electoral registration is central to democratic participation. It is vital therefore that all possible steps should be taken to ensure everyone who is eligible to vote is registered. Registration without application, a more automatic form of registration, is a much-needed improvement to our outdated voter registration system.

The Electoral Commission’s most recent analysis of electoral registers estimated that between 7 and 8 million people are missing from the electoral rolls.[6] ERS constituency estimates based on these findings suggest that, in some places, as much as 20% of the total eligible population is likely to be missing from the register.[7] [For our interactive constituency map visit: https://electoral-reform.org.uk/latest-news-and-research/parliamentary-briefings/automatic-voter-registration-avr-briefing/]

Completeness has remained fairly static over time and the Electoral Commission has stated that, ‘there is little evidence to suggest that levels of accuracy and completeness are likely to significantly improve without major changes to the current electoral registration system.’[8]

81% of British people support automatically registering voters with 48% strongly supporting this change.[9]

Not only are millions missing from the electoral rolls but those missing are unequally distributed across society. Research suggests that the current system of registration is proving a barrier, particularly to young people and people in privately rented accommodation. In 2022, 65% of private renters were registered compared to 95% of owner occupiers and 88% of those with a mortgage; only 60% of 18- and 19-year-olds were registered compared to 96% of those aged 65 and over and only 16% of attainers (those aged 16 and 17 in England) were registered.[10]

Most countries use a form of automatic registration[11] and pilots of automatic registration in Wales have shown how much it can improve completeness of the registers (even when restricted to local data).[12] Changes to the annual canvass have already moved the UK’s system closer to automatic registration with EROs using data-matching as an integral part of the registration process and re-registering those who can be reliably matched.

Registration without application has great potential to improve voter registration and ensure that every eligible voter can participate. But it is essential that progress is made quickly to establish pilots and move to registration without application so that at the next General Election millions do not miss out.

For more information on modernising registration: https://electoral-reform.org.uk/latest-news-and-research/parliamentary-briefings/briefing-on-modernising-electoral-registration/

Part 3 – Conduct of Elections

s47 – Voter identification requirements

The introduction of photographic ID in the Elections Act 2022 has, to date, prevented over 42,000 people casting their vote. Despite little evidence to suggest voter ID was needed, the current scheme is highly restrictive with only a handful of IDs accepted (many of which need to be paid for). Expanding the types of IDs that will be accepted is a welcome move.

Out of all alleged cases of electoral fraud in the 2019 elections, only 33 related to personation fraud at the polling station[13] – this comprises 0.000057% of the over 58 million votes cast in all the elections that took place that year. Only one of those allegations resulted in a conviction, and one a caution.[14] Despite this, the voter ID scheme introduced in the Elections Act 2022 is highly restrictive (compared to other countries that do not have a national ID card) with only a limited number of photographic IDs deemed acceptable and no alternatives for voters who turn up without ID.

The Electoral Commission reported that in the 2024 General Election around 16,000 electors attempted, but were unable to vote due to the Voter ID requirement; this equates to 1 in every 1,200 voters.[15] Similarly, the May 2024 local and mayoral elections reported around 13,000 electors attempted to vote but were turned away because they lacked accepted ID and did not return; in the May 2023 local elections this figure was around 14,000.[16]

Across the first three sets of elections using Voter ID, at least 42,368 voters were denied their right to vote.*[17] [18]

In addition, many voters appear to have been put off by the new requirement. According to the Electoral Commission, when given a list of options, 10% of non-voters gave voter ID as the reason that they did not vote in the 2024 General Election, this figure was 4% when unprompted. Ipsos polling also found that 8% of people said that voter ID made them less likely to want to vote in the May 2023 local elections.[19]

Only 25,000 Voter Authority Certificates were used as ID in local elections in 2023, 22,749 at the local and mayoral elections in 2024 and 72,497 in 2024 General Election. This is far fewer than the number of registered voters who are estimated to need one (around 750,000).[20]

Increasing the range of acceptable identity documents, including non-photographic ID, would make the scheme more proportional. The Cabinet Office report ‘Securing the ballot’, which first suggested introducing ID, recommended that: ‘There is no need to be over elaborate; measures should enhance public confidence and be proportional.’[21] When voter ID was first introduced in Northern Ireland it was not solely photographic ID and elections took place for almost 20 years with this less stringent requirement.

Allowing IDs like bank cards and digital ID, which voters are likely to be carrying on them, will help voters who do not have access to the more restricted forms of ID and make it easier for all voters on the day.

Improvements to prevent any more eligible voters losing their right to vote are essential, but we will only know if these improvements are working if we have records of who is turned away at the polling station. It is critical that the impact of voter ID is monitored and reported to ensure that we have a full picture of how this policy is affecting voters and whether further changes, such as vouching or statutory declarations, are needed.

For more information on Voter ID: https://electoral-reform.org.uk/latest-news-and-research/parliamentary-briefings/briefing-on-voter-id-2026/

Part 4 – Campaigns and Political Donations

s58-s62 – Control of political donations

The role of money in politics is fundamental to the quality of our democracy. Today in our democracy, voters can readily see that those with deeper pockets have more of a say, and this corrodes public confidence. It is vital that we provide greater protection from foreign interference and corruption, and importantly, provide voters with more reason to feel confident that their voices matter.

S60 – donations by companies: The risk of shell companies being used to funnel foreign funds into UK politics was first identified as a risk prior to PPERA.[22] It is very welcome therefore that this bill seeks to address this vulnerability by requiring donor companies to demonstrate they have made sufficient funds in the UK and have a UK connection. However, a UK profit test (instead of revenue) would provide stronger protection in this regard.

s62 – Unincorporated Associations: Donations from Unincorporated Associations (UAs) present a well-documented gap in the UK’s political finance transparency requirements. A lack of transparency around the source of UAs’ political donations undermines efforts to have an open and transparent political finance regime and with few safeguards to prevent impermissible donations, UAs are a potential conduit for foreign funding entering UK politics. It is therefore welcome that this bill seeks to address these issues by introducing permissibility checks, increasing reporting requirements and lowering the contribution thresholds for triggering reporting, as well as extending the rules to candidate donations. However, at £11,180, the threshold for reporting is still high – especially if this same threshold applies to candidate donations.

Donations cap

Over time, both the total amount of donations and the number of very large donations (those over £1 million) from private sources have increased. The extent to which parties are reliant on a handful of very wealthy donors is recognised by the public and is a cause for concern. YouGov finds that 60% of people think that wealthy donors give money to gain influence compared to the 6% who this it is driven by support for the party. [23] Only 13% of people think that there should be no limits on how much people can give in political donations.[24]

In 2011 the Committee on Standards in Public Life produced a report addressing the problems of an increased reliance on significant donations. In their report the Committee said, ‘Over the last few decades all three main parties have instead become dependent on a small number of relatively large donations from individuals, trade unions (for the Labour Party) or other organisations. This dependency has inevitably created a risk that favours will be asked or given in return.’ The CSPL recommended a cap of £10,000 for donations from a single source in a year and for trade union donations to be treated as an aggregation of individual donations subject to opt-in rules.[25]

Since that report, the key problems identified have intensified. Our politics is too reliant on too few, and the sums involved are simply too large. Reducing the amount that single private sources can give to parties not only helps create a fair democratic contest but also protects parties and their representatives.

A donations cap would prevent a small number of wealthy donors dominating political finance, would reduce corruption risk, and is popular with the public.[26]

For more information on political finance: https://electoral-reform.org.uk/latest-news-and-research/parliamentary-briefings/briefing-on-political-finance/

s63-s64 – Information to be included with electronic material

The Electoral Reform Society has long advocated for the extension of the imprint regime to digital election material. Digital imprints, stating who has paid for and promoted content, are aimed at enhancing transparency about who is behind online campaign material. Voters should know who is trying to influence their vote so they are able to make an informed decision at the ballot box, and to hold those seeking to persuade them to account after the election.

Whilst an extension of the current regime is welcome, imprints alone do not provide voters with the full picture. An online ad repository or ‘library’ would assist with improving transparency around digital campaigning. This would allow both the public and regulators to view ads across all platforms and help to identify campaigns that are designed to mislead the audience about their source.

Part 5 – Enforcement and the Electoral Commission

s67 Abolition of maximum penalties in respect of offences triable summarily

An increase to the maximum fine that the Electoral Commission can impose is a welcome step. Currently limited to a maximum individual fine of £20,000, these fines can simply be seen as the ‘cost of doing business’. Multiple parliamentary committees, civil society organisations and campaigners have called for the Commission’s fines to be increased in recent years to provide an effective deterrent.[27] For comparison, the ICO is able to fine organisations up to four percent of global turnover, or £17 million.[28]

Electoral Commission independence

The 2022 Elections Act introduced a requirement for the Electoral Commission to ‘have regard to’ a strategy and policy statement set by ministers which reflects the government’s policy priorities and set out the ‘roles and responsibilities’ of the Commission in achieving those priorities. The Commission must now report annually against that statement to the Speaker’s Committee. A significant imposition on regulatory autonomy.

Electoral management body independence is set out under international law and in a range of international guidelines (such as the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights guidance and the Council of Europe Venice Commission code of practice).

The change brought in under the 2022 Act was criticised by two different international electoral observer missions during the 2024 General Elections.[29] The Electoral Commission have themselves been highly critical of the change noting that allowing government to guide its work, ‘is inconsistent with the role that an independent electoral commission plays in a healthy democracy.’[30] In addition, there is nothing to prevent a government majority on the Speaker’s Committee through which the Electoral Commission is directly accountable to parliament.

The Strategy and Policy Statement and lack of safeguards create a very dangerous set of instruments that could seriously damage electoral integrity.

It is critical that the Electoral Commission’s independence is restored by removing the strategy and policy statement provisions in part 3 of the Elections Act 2022. It is also important to ensure that the Speaker’s Committee remains cross-party, and this could be strengthened by inviting ordinary ‘lay’ members of the public to join the committee (much like Parliament’s Standards Committee) and putting in place measures to prevent any party having a majority on the committee.

For more information on any of the issues in the briefing please contact ERS@electoral-reform.org.uk

[1] Huebner, C., and Eichhorn, J., ‘Evidence and Good Practice on Lowering the Voting Age to 16’. https://www.jrrt.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Votes-at-16-report-FINAL.pdf

[2] Huebner, C. & Eichhorn, J. (2022). The Tide Raising all Boats? Social Class Differences in Political Participation among Young People in Scotland. Scottish Affairs, 31(2), 165-189.

[3] Griffiths, J. D., Larner, J., Wyn Jones, R., & Poole, E. G., (2025) ‘A False Start: Votes-at-16 in Wales in the 2021 Senedd Cymru election’, Wales Governance Centre.

[4] Huebner, C., Smith, K. A., Mycock, A., Loughran, T., & Eichhorn, J. (2021). ‘Making Votes-at-16 Work in Wales. Lessons for the Future’ (pp. 1–34). Nottingham: Nottingham Trent University. https://www.ntu.ac.uk/media/documents/nce/Huebner-et-al_2021_Making-Votes-at-16-work-in-Wales.pdf

[5] ONS Research in 2017 showed there was around 1.5 million 16- and 17-year-olds in the UK (the current figure stands at 1.6 million). If enfranchised this group would make up around 3% of the voting age population. The small size of this cohort would have little impact on vote shares even if they achieved 100% turnout and all voted the same way. https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/elections/electoralregistration/articles/whatimpactcouldloweringtheukvotingageto16haveontheshapeoftheelectorate/2017-07-14

[6]  The Electoral Commission, “2023 report: Electoral registers in the UK”, 2023. Available at: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/research-reports-and-data/electoral-registration-research/accuracy-and-completeness-electoral-registers/2023-report-electoral-registers-uk

[7] (Cities of London and Westminster (20.3%), Leeds Central and Headingley (20.2%), Bristol Central (19.6%), Sheffield Central (19.5%)).[7] Estimates are based on ONS 2021 Census and Scottish Census 2022 population figures and Electoral Commission data on registration levels by housing tenure. https://electoral-reform.org.uk/latest-news-and-research/parliamentary-briefings/automatic-voter-registration-avr-briefing/

[8] Electoral Commission ‘2023 report: Electoral registers in the UK’, 2023

Available at: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/research-reports-and-data/electoral-registration-research/2023-report-electoral-registers-uk

[9] https://yougov.co.uk/politics/articles/49960-what-electoral-reform-proposals-would-britons-support

[10] Electoral Commission, ‘Who is and isn’t registered to vote’, 2022. Available at: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/research-reports-and-data/electoral-registration-research/explore-data-who-and-isnt-registered-vote

[11] Toby. S. James and Paul Bernal (2020) Is it time for Automatic Voter Registration in the UK? Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust: York. https://www.jrrt.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Is_it_time_for_AVR_in_the_UK.pdf

[12] Electoral Commission, ‘Automatic registration pilots evaluation’, 2025. Available at: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/research-reports-and-data/electoral-registration-research/automatic-registration-pilots-evaluation

[13] Uberoi and Johnstone, “Political disengagement in the UK: Who is disengaged?”, House of Commons Library, 2022. Available at: https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7501/CBP-7501.pdf

[14] Electoral Commission, “2019 Electoral Fraud Data”, 2020. Available at: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/research-reports-and-data/electoral-fraud-data/2019-electoral-fraud-data

[15] Electoral Commission, “Voter ID at the 2024 UK general election”, 2024. Available at:  https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/research-reports-and-data/our-reports-and-data-past-elections-and-referendums/voter-id-2024-uk-general-election

[16] Electoral Commission, “Voter ID at the May 2023 local elections in England: interim analysis”, 2023. Available at: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/research-reports-and-data/our-reports-and-data-past-elections-and-referendums/voter-id-may-2023-local-elections-england-interim-analysis

[17] Ibid.

* Those recorded as having been turned away and did not return at the 2023 local elections, 2024 local and mayoral elections and 2024 General Election combined. The 2024 General Election was the last election in which returning officers were legally required to collect these statistics.

[18] Electoral Commission, “Voter ID at the 2024 UK general election”, 2024. Available at:  https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/research-reports-and-data/our-reports-and-data-past-elections-and-referendums/voter-id-2024-uk-general-election

[19] Ipsos UK, “Written evidence (VID0010) House of Lords Constitution Committee inquiry into voter ID”, 2023. Available at: https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/126939/pdf/

[20] The Electoral Commission, “Voter ID at the May 2023 local elections in England: interim analysis”, 2023. Available at: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/research-reports-and-data/our-reports-and-data-past-elections-and-referendums/report-may-2023-local-elections-england

[21] Cabinet Office, ‘Securing the Ballot: review into electoral fraud’, 2016. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/securing-the-ballot-review-into-electoral-fraud

[22] Committee on Standards in Public Life, fifth report, ‘The Funding of Political Parties in the United Kingdom’, 1998. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7daa32e5274a5eaea6596a/5thInquiry_FullReport.pdf

[23] YouGov, 23 September 2024, 4046 GB adults: ‘Do you think that wealthy people make donations to individual politicians more because they support them and want them and their party to succeed, or more because they are trying to gain influence?’ https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/survey-results/daily/2024/09/23/a132c/1

[24] YouGov, biannual tracker at 29 December 2025, 1668 – 1804 GB Adults: ‘Should there be a limit of donations made to political parties by individuals?’

https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/trackers/should-there-be-a-limit-of-donations-made-to-political-parties-by-individuals

[25] Committee on Standards in Public Life, thirteenth report, ‘Political Party Finance: ending the big donor culture’, 2011. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/political-party-finance-ending-the-big-donor-culture

[26] For example: Poll by Survation on behalf of 38degrees, cited in PoliticsHome, ‘Strong Support For Bringing In A Cap On Political Donations’, 23 Dec 2025. https://www.politicshome.com/news/article/strong-support-for-cap-on-political-party-donations-poll-shows; Electoral Reform Society, ‘Deal or No Deal’, https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Deal-or-no-deal-Party-Funding.pdf

[27] See, for example,  Electoral Reform Society, ‘Reining in the Political ‘Wild West’: Campaign Rules for the 21st Century’, 2019. https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/latest-news-and-research/publications/reining-in-the-political-wild-west-campaign-rules-for-the-21st-century/#sub-section-9

[28]See, for example,  Electoral Reform Society, ‘Reining in the Political ‘Wild West’: Campaign Rules for the 21st Century’, 2019. https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/latest-news-and-research/publications/reining-in-the-political-wild-west-campaign-rules-for-the-21st-century/#sub-section-9

[29] Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, ‘Final Report CPA BIMR Election Assessment Mission’ (pages 8/9) https://www.uk-cpa.org/media/gyskl0w3/final-report-cpa-bimr-election-assessment-mission-uk-general-election-2024.pdf

OSCE office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, ‘United Kingdom, General Election, 4 July 2024: Final Report’, 2025 (Page 10) https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/uk/592972

[30] Electoral Commission, Letter from Commissioners: Strategy and Policy Statement measures in the Elections Bill, February 2022. Available at: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/news-and-views/key-correspondence/letter-commissioners-strategy-and-policy-statement-measures-elections-bill

The Electoral Commission’s most recent analysis of electoral registers estimated that between 7 and 8 million people are missing from the electoral rolls.[1] ERS constituency estimates based on these findings suggest that, in some places, as much as 20% of the total eligible population is likely to be missing from the register.[2]

In the 2024 General Election, voter turnout was just 59.9%, narrowly beating the previous historically low turnout of 59.4% in 2001. However, what the turnout figure fails to show is how many people were unable to vote because they weren’t registered to vote in the first place. With around 19 million people not turning out to vote and 8 million likely missing from the register – a total 27.5 million people did not participate in the election: Nearly as many people didn’t vote as did in 2024.[3]

Eligible citizens missing from the register is a democratic problem. Not only are these potential voters not able individually to exercise their right to vote, but collectively their voices are not being heard by decision makers. This is particularly a problem when missing eligible voters are not evenly distributed within the population.

81% of British people support automatically registering voters with 48% strongly supporting this change.[4]

Comprehensive and accurate electoral registration which reaches as many eligible voters as possible, is critical to our democracy. It is vital therefore that all possible steps should be taken to ensure everyone who is eligible to vote is registered.

In this briefing:

• How the registration system currently works
• Problems with the current system
• Automatic Voter Registration (AVR)
• Pilots of AVR in Wales
• International examples
• Assisted/integrated registration

How the UK’s electoral registration system works

In 2014, the UK moved away from a model of household registration where one person (the ‘head of household’) would apply on behalf of all residents, to a system of Individual Electoral Registration (IER). Under IER, Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) were given powers to match names and addresses on current electoral registers against data held by the Department for Work and Pensions. This process of registration ‘confirmation’ allowed EROs to transfer existing electors, who had been confirmed in the data matching process, onto the IER register.

The annual canvass (required under section 9D of the Representation of the People Act 1983) which is used to identify changes to the register, continued under IER via the Household Enquiry Form (HEF) and house to house inquiries. However, the Electoral Registration and Administration Act 2013 which introduced IER also contained powers to amend or abolish the canvass via secondary legislation.

At the same time, a system of online registration was introduced and a requirement for date of birth and National Insurance numbers to be provided as identifiers. However, despite being able to register via an online national portal, under the current system, each application is determined locally and there is no centralised database.

In 2019, changes to the annual canvass were made introducing automatic re-registration.[5] The annual canvass now begins with a data-matching step (against both national (DWP) and local data). If a registration can be reliably matched, the ERO will communicate with the resident but, if that information is correct, a response from the resident is not necessary in order for them to remain on the register (it remains an offence to fail to notify of a change or provide false information). The ERO does not need to send a reminder or chase a response (this is called ‘route one’). If the registration cannot be matched, a process similar to the previous canvass takes place with a minimum of three attempts to contact the property/residents (route two). A third route to registration is available for properties such as care homes and student accommodation where one person can be responsible for registering all residents.

These updates to registration have already moved the UK’s system closer to automatic registration with EROs using data-mining as an integral part of the registration process and re-registering those who can be reliably matched. However, there remain problems with the system as it stands.

Problems with the current system

Missing millions

Across Great Britain, between 7 and 8 million people are missing from the electoral rolls according to the Electoral Commission’s analysis. Completeness of the electoral registers stands at 86% across Great Britain (86% in England, 81% Scotland, 87% Wales, 83% Northern Ireland).[6]

Completeness has remained fairly static over time. Between 2011 and 2023, completeness of the registers across Great Britain has been between 82 and 86 percent. Only in Northern Ireland has there been a marked improvement, with registration increasing from 71% in 2012 to 83% in 2023.

This means that for the last four General Elections, millions of eligible voters have missed out.

In its latest report on registration, the Electoral Commission states that, “there is little evidence to suggest that levels of accuracy and completeness are likely to significantly improve without major changes to the current electoral registration system.”[7]

This points to the reality that without change to the UK’s electoral registration processes, millions of eligible voters will continue to miss out on having a say in our democracy.

The UK currently ranks in the bottom half of European countries on electoral integrity scoring which includes measurements of accessibility and registration. The Electoral Integrity Project global report in 2025 noted that electoral registration in the UK, “has been a long-term area of weakness in electoral integrity scores”.[8]

Unequal registration

Not only are millions missing from the electoral rolls but those missing are unequally distributed across society. Research suggests that the current system of registration is proving a barrier, particularly to young people and people in privately rented accommodation.

In 2022, 65% of private renters were registered compared to 95% of owner occupiers and 88% of those with a mortgage; only 60% of 18- and 19-year-olds were registered compared to 96% of those aged 65 and over and only 16% of attainers (those aged 16 and 17 in England) were registered.[9]

People who move home more frequently are particularly affected: only 39% of those who have been at their address for a year or less are registered to vote compared to 91% who have been at their address for 5-10 years.[10] The English Housing Survey (2024-25) finds that the average length of time households spent in their current home was 13.9 years but for private renters this reduces to 4.7 years. In 2024-25, approximately 1.8 million households moved home in the previous 12 months and around half of these were moves into or out of private rented dwellings.[11]

Failure to register does not necessarily indicate an apathy towards voting. Surveys of poll workers consistently find that the most common problem on polling day is people turning up to vote and not being registered. Half of poll workers in the 2018 local elections in England experienced at least one person turning up to vote who was not on the electoral register, some had experienced turning away more than 10 potential voters.[12]

Duplicate registrations and resources

The introduction of an online portal for registration has seen an increase in event-led registration in which large numbers of applications are received in the run up to elections (often immediately before the registration deadline) putting extra pressure on EROs. Often these applications are duplicates of existing applications as there is no way for voters to check if they are already registered online.

In the run up to the 2024 General Election, just under 2.9 million applications to register to vote were made between when the election was called and the registration deadline (May 22^nd – June 18^th).[13] Despite a huge surge of 632,901 applications on the last day, the overall number of applications was still well short of the estimated 8.2 million people missing. A similar effort to increase registration was seen in 2019, with more than 3 million people registering to vote between the 29^th Oct 2019 and the 26^th Nov 2019.[14] In the run up to general elections, EROs are under huge pressure dealing with sometimes upwards of 100,000 registration applications per day, putting enormous strain on electoral services. In 2017, duplicate applications during the election period ranged from 30% to 70% of applications by area.[15]

Automatic Voter Registration (AVR)

A system of automatic registration would see voters added to the electoral rolls using existing data without the need to initiate the registration process themselves (this is not far from the ‘route 1’ process of the reformed annual canvass that currently takes place as described above). Once the electoral rolls have been populated, voters are contacted and given the opportunity to apply for anonymous registration.[16] Most countries use a form of automatic registration.[17]

Automatic voter registration is different from assisted registration in which voters are prompted to apply for registration during other interactions with government offices – such as when applying for driver’s licence (see final section).

In a feasibility study into the use of automatic, more automated and assisted registration, the Electoral Commission found that “all the reforms were feasible from a technical and operational perspective and could be implemented without radically altering the structure of the electoral registration system in the UK.”[18]

In 2023, the Electoral Commission highlighted how AVR could be implemented with Passport Office data. The Passport Office already undertakes rigorous checks on the information provided, collects the data needed for electoral registration and is already sharing this data with government departments to undertake around 25 million identity checks per year.[19]

There is widespread and longstanding cross-party parliamentary support for automatic voter registration including from the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee in its 2014 report on Voter Engagement, the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Democratic Participation’s report on the Missing Millions, and the Levelling Up, Housing and Communities Committee report on Electoral Registration in 2024.[20] [21] [22]

Devolved elections

Electoral registration for local registers is devolved in Scotland and Wales and the Welsh government has recently legislated via the Elections and Elected Bodies (Wales) Act (2024) to pilot AVR.[23] In Scotland there have been cross-party calls for the introduction of AVR, with an amendment to the Scottish Elections (Representation and Reform) Act which enables AVR to be pursued at local authority level.[24] Glasgow may be the first place to trial AVR.[25]

Wales AVR pilots

In 2025 three Welsh councils piloted automatic voter registration (a fourth council tested just data-matching to see whether the electoral register could be re-created from local data).

The pilots identified and automatically registered 14,500 new electors. This represents between 2% and 8% of the registers in these areas (Gwynedd 8%, Powys 5%, Newport 2%). The pilots were particularly successful in registering attainers. Between 16% and 37% of attainers were added in Gwynedd and Powys.[26]

The pilots were able to utilise local data such as council tax and housing records to match residents. However, the pilots could not access UK level datasets (such as the DWP) and as a result, despite very positive results, there were limits to how effective the pilots could be. The Carmarthenshire pilot, which looked at re-creating electoral rolls, found that 60% of existing electors can be matched on local data. A UK-wide system of AVR with national data therefore has the potential to have an even greater impact.

The Electoral Commission review of the pilots found in initial assessments, that AVR did not negatively affect the accuracy of the registers and there were few concerns raised from those in the pilot areas.[27]

Important considerations

Edited/open register

The UK currently has two versions of the electoral register: the full electoral register and the open register (sometimes called the edited register). The full electoral register contains the name and address of everyone who has registered, it is restricted and is only accessible for certain purposes including electoral administration, campaigning activities, preventing and detecting crime, checking applications for loans or credit, and jury summoning in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

Whilst the responsibility for registration (whether initiating or confirming) currently lays with the individual, registration is still compulsory and citizens can be fined for not registering.

EROs are also required to create an open register. The open register contains the names and addresses of anybody who has not opted out (those under 16 are automatically removed). At present around 60% of those registered have opted out of the open register.[28] The open register is available for purchase by private individuals, companies or organisations and there are no restrictions on its sale.

The open register would need reviewing under a system of automatic registration and our recommendation would be that automatically enrolled citizens do not have their data shared on the open register, effectively removing this register.

Anonymous registration

Anonymous registration would still be possible under AVR. If AVR is introduced, it is paramount that those currently registered anonymously are contacted and informed of the changes to the system. They should then be supported by local authorities to ensure that they remain anonymous. For this reason, there should be a designated period of time in which it is the responsibility of the local authority to contact all anonymous voters and assist them with entering the register. The Welsh pilots allowed for 60 days in which to respond to request anonymous registration. Once an anonymous registration is in place it should remain so for a longer period of time than the current 12 months.

Lessons from overseas

Many countries register their voters automatically. Some examples are:

Sweden

All persons who qualify to be included on the Swedish Tax Agency’s population register 30 days before the election day are automatically registered and mailed a polling card. In 2022, the voting age population of Sweden was 8.15 million and 7.78 million people were registered to vote.[29]

Germany

Germany has a system of automatic voter registration which uses their national population register. Every resident in Germany is required to register with their municipal authority when they move home and the municipal authorities utilise this data to create the electoral roll. In 2025 the voting age population was 61.5 million and 60.5 million people were registered to vote.[30]

Australia

Australia has a system of direct enrolment which uses data from other government agencies to identify and verify people to add to or update the register.[31]  The Australian system is an ‘opt out’ rather than ‘opt in’ system in which voters are automatically added if they don’t respond to the notification (similar to ‘route one’ in the UK described above). 97.6% of Australian electors are on the register compared to 90.9% in 2010 before the introduction of automatic registration.[32]

Australia moved to automated registration from a system of continuous registration (self-enrolment) within 18 months. The enabling legislation was passed in June 2012, pilots ran in late 2012 and then was rolled out across the rest of the country by the September 2013 elections. Further improvements were made subsequently, enabling voters to self-register online and further outreach activities. [33]

Assisted/integrated registration

Often termed “motor-voter” registration after the initiative in the US, assisted registration would nudge people to register to vote when they interact with other government services. The USA’s National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) required that states offer voters the opportunity to register to vote at motor vehicle agencies and specific state and local offices.  Any application for a driver’s license (including a renewal) serves as a voter registration application unless the applicant does not sign the application. It may also be used to update an existing registration.[34] In 2022, over half of US electoral registrations came via this route.[35]

A similar system could be implemented in the UK when a potential voter interacts with a government agency, such as the DVLA. This could be done via a tick box on paperwork required to obtain a driver’s licence which would give the DVLA permission to pass on the information necessary to register to vote to the local Electoral Registration Officer. In 2024-2025 the DVLA issued 12.5 million driving licenses. An assisted registration system would allow these 12.5 million applications to be checked and updated against the electoral role helping to maintain the accuracy and completeness of the register.[36]

Researchers have highlighted several other touchpoints with government services where potential voters could be nudged to update their details or register to vote:[37]

• Applying for a passport: 7,800,233 people applied for a passport in 2024[38]
• Registering for council tax: 24,926,000 dwellings were liable for council tax in 2024[39]
• Updating driving licence details: 12,500,000 driving licences were issued in 2024/2025[40]
• Registering at university: 2,904,425 undergraduates and 847,905 postgraduates enrolled in higher education in 2023/2024[41]
• Claiming benefits: 23,200,000 people claimed some form of DWP benefit in February 2025.[42] [43]

This equates to over 72 million points of contact between government bodies and potential voters per year, all of which could be used to update and enrol people on the register through assisted registration. There will undoubtedly be crossover between these groups, however, these points of contact could, especially in conjunction with AVR, help to keep the electoral registers up to date.

 End Notes

[1]  The Electoral Commission, “2023 report: Electoral registers in the UK”, 2023. Available at: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/research-reports-and-data/electoral-registration-research/accuracy-and-completeness-electoral-registers/2023-report-electoral-registers-uk

[2] (Cities of London and Westminster (20.3%), Leeds Central and Headingley (20.2%), Bristol Central (19.6%), Sheffield Central (19.5%)).[2] Estimates are based on ONS 2021 Census and Scottish Census 2022 population figures and Electoral Commission data on registration levels by housing tenure. https://electoral-reform.org.uk/latest-news-and-research/parliamentary-briefings/automatic-voter-registration-avr-briefing/

[3] Electoral Reform Society, ‘A System Out of Step: The 2024 General Election’, 2024. Available at: https://electoral-reform.org.uk/a-system-out-of-step-the-2024-general-election/

[4] https://yougov.co.uk/politics/articles/49960-what-electoral-reform-proposals-would-britons-support

[5] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/833308/Reform-of-the-Annual-Canvass-Statement-of-Policy.pdf

[6] Figures based on the December 2022 electoral rolls. https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/research-reports-and-data/electoral-registration-research/2023-report-electoral-registers-uk

[7] Electoral Commission ‘2023 report: Electoral registers in the UK’, 2023

Available at: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/research-reports-and-data/electoral-registration-research/2023-report-electoral-registers-uk

[8] Garnett, Holly Ann, Toby S. James, and Sofia Caal-Lam. 2025. Year in Elections Global Report 2025. The Electoral Integrity Project. https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/reports

[9] Electoral Commission, ‘Who is and isn’t registered to vote’, 2022. Available at: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/research-reports-and-data/electoral-registration-research/explore-data-who-and-isnt-registered-vote

[10] Ibid.

[11] https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/chapters-for-english-housing-survey-2024-to-2025-headline-findings-on-demographics-and-household-resilience/chapter-3-housing-history-and-future-housing

[12] James, T. S., & Clark, A. (2019). Electoral integrity, voter fraud and voter ID in polling stations: lessons from English local elections. Policy Studies, 41(2–3), 190–209. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2019.1694656

[13] GOV.uk, “Register To Vote Performance. Applications breakdown 22/05/24 to 16/06/24”. Available at:  https://www.registertovote.service.gov.uk/performance/applications_breakdown/with_dates?fromDay=22&fromMonth=05&fromYear=2024&toDay=18&toMonth=06&toYear=2024

[14] Rowena Mason, “Voter registration rise boosts Labour’s election hopes”, The Guardian, 2019. Available at:  https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/nov/26/voter-registration-rise-boosts-labours-election-hopes

[15] The Electoral Commission, “Urgent reforms needed to get millions of people registered to vote”, September 2023. Available at: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/changing-electoral-law/a-modern-electoral-register/modernising-electoral-registration-feasibility-studies/electoral-registration-need-reform

[16] Anonymous registration is available for anyone who feels that being on the register could impact their safety or the safety of anyone in their household. https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/voting-and-elections/register-vote/register-vote-anonymously

[17] Toby. S. James and Paul Bernal (2020) Is it time for Automatic Voter Registration in the UK? Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust: York. https://www.jrrt.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Is_it_time_for_AVR_in_the_UK.pdf

[18] Electoral Commission, ‘Modernising electoral registration: feasibility studies’, 2019

https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/news-and-views/our-priorities-reforming-elections/a-modern-electoral-register/modernising-electoral-registration-feasibility-studies

[19] Electoral Commission, “2023 report: Electoral registers in the UK”, 2023. Available at:

https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/research-reports-and-data/electoral-registration-research/accuracy-and-completeness-electoral-registers/2023-report-electoral-registers-uk

[20] House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, “Voter engagement in the UK”, Fourth Report of Session 2014-2015, 2014. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmpolcon/232/232.pdf

[21] Toby James, Bite the Ballot and Alistair Clark, “Missing Millions Still Missing: A Vision for Electoral Modernisation in the UK”. All Party Parliamentary Group on Democratic Participation, 2019. Available at: https://tobysjames.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/missing-millions-still-missing-1.pdf

[22] House of Commons Levelling Up, Housing and Communities Committee, “Electoral Registration” Fourth Report of Session 2023-2024, 2024. Available at: https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/43968/documents/217860/default/

[23] https://www.gov.wales/wales-passes-landmark-bill-introduce-automatic-registration-electors-and-modernise-electoral

[24] https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2025/4/part/7

[25] https://www.glasgowlive.co.uk/news/glasgow-automatic-voter-registration-pilot-31321525

[26] Electoral Commission, ‘Automatic registration pilots evaluation’, 2025. Available at: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/research-reports-and-data/electoral-registration-research/automatic-registration-pilots-evaluation

[27] Ibid.

[28] House of Commons library, ‘Electoral registers and access to them’, 2026. Available at:

https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn01020/

[29] International IDEA voter turnout database https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout-database

[30] ibid

[31] Australian Electoral Commission website, https://www.aec.gov.au/Enrolling_to_vote/About_Electoral_Roll/direct.htm

[32] https://www.jrrt.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Towards-Automatic-Voter-Registration-Lessons-from-Canada-and-Australia-FINAL.pdf

[33] Sonali Campion, Professor Toby S. James & Professor Holly Ann Garnett ‘Towards Automatic Voter Registration: Lessons from Canada and Australia’. Available at: https://www.jrrt.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Towards-Automatic-Voter-Registration-Lessons-from-Canada-and-Australia-FINAL.pdf

[34] https://www.justice.gov/crt/national-voter-registration-act-1993-nvra

[35] Professor Toby S. James and Professor Paul Bernal, ‘Improving Voter Registration: A GUIDE TO INTRODUCING AUTOMATIC VOTER REGISTRATION’. Available at: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/98707/1/A-Guide-to-Improving-Voter-Registration-Report-Final.pdf

[36]  DVLA, Annual Report & Accounts 24/25 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/687e00805f0f5104b9806beb/DVLA_annual_report_and_accounts_2024_to_2025.pdf

[37] Professor Toby S. James and Professor Paul Bernal, ‘Improving Voter Registration: A GUIDE TO INTRODUCING AUTOMATIC VOTER REGISTRATION’. Available at: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/98707/1/A-Guide-to-Improving-Voter-Registration-Report-Final.pdf

[38] Government statistics, passport and citizenship data https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/passports-and-citizenship-data-q4-2024

[39] Government statistics https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/council-taxbase-2024-in-england/local-authority-council-taxbase-in-england-2024

[40] DVLA, Annual Report & Accounts 24/25 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/687e00805f0f5104b9806beb/DVLA_annual_report_and_accounts_2024_to_2025.pdf

[41]  Higher Education Statistics Agency https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/sb271/figure-3

[42] These include: Attendance Allowance, Benefit combinations, Bereavement benefits, Bereavement Support Payment, Carer’s Allowance, Disability Living Allowance, Employment and Support Allowance, Housing Benefit, HB flows, Incapacity Benefit, Income Support, Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit, Jobseeker’s Allowance, Pension Credit, Personal Independence Payment, Severe Disablement Allowance, State Pension, Universal Credit, Widow’s Benefit

[43] Government statistics https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/dwp-benefits-statistics-august-2025/dwp-benefits-statistics-august-2025#:~:text=24%20million%20people%20claimed%20some,million%20were%20of%20Working%20Age

Automatic Voter Registration (AVR) would mean that all eligible voters are put directly on the electoral rolls ensuring that the millions of missing voters are registered and that no one needlessly misses out on their democratic right to vote.

Millions missing from the register

In September last year, the Electoral Commission reported that between 7 and 8 million people were incorrectly registered or completely missing from the electoral registers across the UK.[1]

The Electoral Reform Society (ERS) estimates that 7.6 million eligible voters are missing from the electoral registers in England and Wales. Numbers vary across constituencies but in the worst areas, up to a fifth of potential voters may not be on the register.

AVR would increase the completeness and accuracy of the register

Not only would AVR ensure that all eligible voters are on the registers, but it would help to deal with inaccurate registrations, for instance where entries have become redundant due to home movement.

The top 5 constituencies with the largest estimated percentage of potential voters missing from the electoral registers are: Cities of London and Westminster (20.3%), Leeds Central and Headingley (20.2%), Bristol Central (19.6%), Sheffield Central (19.5%) and Liverpool Riverside (19.4%).

Top 10 Constituencies with the largest % of voters missing from the electoral register

Under-registered groups

It is well documented that some groups are less likely to register to vote than others depending on age, ethnicity, social grade, housing tenure and disability. Research has found that young people, minority ethnic groups, people in lower DE socio-economic groups and people in privately rented accommodation are less likely to be registered to vote.[2][3] Mencap research found that 60% of people with learning disabilities who didn’t vote said it was because registering to vote was too difficult.[4]

AVR would ensure that a significant barrier to taking part in the democratic process is removed, improving the completeness of the register and ensuring under-registered groups are on the electoral rolls.

Pressures on EROs

AVR would also reduce the pressure on Electoral Registration Officers in the run up to elections. In 2019, after the General Election was called, more than 3 million people registered to vote during the short campaign (29^th Oct 2019 – 26^th Nov 2019). In the same period before the 2017 General Election, the figure was just over 2.3 million.[5] EROs were dealing with upwards of 100,000 registration applications per day in the run up to the election in 2019, putting enormous strain on electoral services. AVR would remove the last minute dash for registration.

Support for AVR

Cross-party parliamentary support for automatic voter registration has come from the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee in its 2014 report on Voter Engagement, the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Democratic Participation’s report on the Missing Millions and the Levelling Up, Housing and Communities Committee report on Electoral Registration.

The Electoral Commission called for automatic or direct voter registration processes in 2017, and there is widespread civil society support

In 2019, the Electoral Commission released feasibility studies on automatic/automated voter registration, which showed that moves to automatic or more automated registration ‘are feasible from a technical and operational perspective and could be implemented without radically altering the structure of the electoral registration system in the UK’.[6] In 2023 they highlighted how AVR could be implemented via the HM Passport Office which already undertakes rigorous checks on the information provided, collects the data needed to undertake electoral registration and is already sharing this data to government departments and public sector bodies for 25 million identity checks per year.[7]

Automatic or more automated registration could be combined with other modernisations, such as a more centralised or joined-up database and a registration look up facility, to further improve accuracy and completeness of the registers and reduce the pressures on EROs.

Anonymous registration would still be possible under AVR. If AVR is introduced, it is paramount that those currently registered anonymously are contacted and informed of the changes to the system, they should then be supported by local authorities to ensure that they remain anonymous. For this reason there should be a designated period of time in which it is the responsibility of the local authority to contact all anonymous voters and assist them with entering the register. It has been suggested that the period of anonymous registration be extended to 5 years from the current 12 months and that the attesters for anonymous registration be expanded to ‘reflect victims’ lived experiences of abuse’.[8]

Comparative Evidence

The UK wouldn’t be alone in moving to AVR. For instance Sweden uses an automatic voter registration model.[9] All persons who qualify to be included on the Swedish Tax Agency’s population register 30 days before the election day are automatically registered and mailed a polling card. In 2022, the voting age population of Sweden was 8.1 million and over 7.75 million people were registered to vote. Turnout was 84%.[10]

In America, 23 states and the District of Columbia have approved AVR and more states are expected to pass similar provisions.[11]  Oregon introduced AVR in 2016, the mechanism compelled the Department of Motor Vehicles offices to provide the necessary data for electoral registration to the Secretary of State. Since introducing AVR in 2016, Oregon has seen registration rates quadruple. In the first six months after AVR was implemented in Vermont in 2017, registration rates jumped 62 percent when compared to the first half of 2016.

[1] The Electoral Commission, “2023 report: Electoral registers in the UK”, 2023. Available at: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/research-reports-and-data/electoral-registration-research/accuracy-and-completeness-electoral-registers/2023-report-electoral-registers-uk

[2] Uberoi and Johnstone, “Political disengagement in the UK: Who is disengaged?,” House of Commons Library, 2022. Available at: https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7501/CBP-7501.pdf

[3] Generation Rent, “SUBURBANISATION OF RENTERS BOOSTS OUR INFLUENCE AT THE BALLOT BOX”. Available at: https://www.generationrent.org/2023/11/16/suburbanisation-of-renters-boosts-our-influence-at-the-ballot-box/

[4] Mencap, ‘People with a learning disability’s passion for politics thwarted by system of excludes them,’ 8 October 2014. Available at: https://www.mencap.org.uk/press-release/people-learning-disabilitys-passion-politics-thwarted-system-excludes-them

[5]Rowena Mason, “Voter registration rise boosts Labour’s election hopes”, The Guardian, 2019. Available at:  https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/nov/26/voter-registration-rise-boosts-labours-election-hopes

[6] The Electoral Commission, “Modernising electoral registration: feasibility studies”, 2019. Available at: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/changing-electoral-law/a-modern-electoral-register/modernising-electoral-registration-feasibility-studies

[7] The Electoral Commission, “2023 report: Electoral registers in the UK”, 2023. Available at: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/research-reports-and-data/electoral-registration-research/accuracy-and-completeness-electoral-registers/2023-report-electoral-registers-uk

[8] Toby James and Paul Bernall, “Is it time for Automatic Voter Registration in the UK?”, Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust: York, 2020. Available at: https://tobysjamesdotcom.files.wordpress.com/2020/04/is-it-time-for-automatic-voter-registration-single-sides.pdf

[9] Nordic Co-Operation, “The right to vote in Sweden”, 2024. Available at: https://www.norden.org/en/info-norden/right-vote-sweden

[10] International IDEA, “Voter Turnout Database, Sweden” 2022. Available at: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/261/40

[11] Brennan Centre for Justice, “Automatic Voter Registration, a Summary”, 2023. Available at: https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/automatic-voter-registration-summary

The Electoral Reform Society is the UK’s leading voice for democratic reform. We work with everyone – from political parties, civil society groups and academics to our own members and supporters and the wider public – to campaign for a better democracy in the UK.

Our vision is of a democracy fit for the 21st century, where every voice is heard, every vote is valued equally, and every citizen is empowered to take part. We make the case for lasting political reforms, we seek to embed democracy into the heart of public debate, and we foster the democratic spaces which encourage active citizenship.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of the existing system of electoral registration?

The Society welcomes the introduction of online registration and the annual canvass reforms to help improve the accuracy and completeness of the register. However, there remain problems with the completeness of the register with some voters less likely to be registered than others. The system also creates pressures on local authorities around election time which could be alleviated by modernising the process. There are various mechanisms which could be introduced which would support increasing registrations, and the accuracy and completeness of the register.

• Motor-voter registration

Provides voters the opportunity to register to vote at often frequented services, for example:  their county or government registration office, motor vehicle agency, schools and hospitals.

• Automatic-voter registration (AVR)

Voters are entered into the electoral register when they are eligible to vote. This can either be when they reach voting age, or when they are eligible to vote e.g., migrants who are legal residents of the UK.

• Election day registration

Allows the qualified resident to both register and cast their ballot on polling day.

• Centralised national register

Electoral registers are held by local government bodies, a centralised national register would streamline the collection of data in one database enabling other election modernisations.

How does the system of Individual Electoral Registration compare to an automatic or assisted system of voter registration?

The ERS supports the introduction of automatic or more automated voter registration. AVR would increase completeness and accuracy of the register and ensure that under-registered groups are on the electoral rolls. Under IER, electors sign up online and are verified against DWP records – each application is determined locally. There is no direct link between the online registration service and electoral registers so it’s not possible to automatically detect duplicate applications. There are an estimated 8.3 to 9.4 million eligible voters not correctly registered and between 4.7 and 5.6 million inaccurate registrations.[1] This equates to around 1 in 10 of current entries being inaccurate[2]. Other issues with IER are discussed below, including time pressures on Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) in the run up to the election, and the individual responsibility of the voter to register entrenching existing barriers to registration e.g. age, social class, ethnicity and disability.

In 2019, the Electoral Commission[3] released feasibility studies on automatic/automated voter registration, which showed that moves to automatic or more automated registration ‘are feasible from a technical and operational perspective and could be implemented without radically altering the structure of the electoral registration system in the UK’.

Automatic or more automated registration combined with other modernisations such as a centralised database and a look up facility, could improve accuracy and completeness of the registers and reduce the pressures on EROs.

Currently individuals opt-in to the register, to remove concerns around lack of citizen consent an opt-out option could be introduced.

Which countries have high levels of electoral registration, and what lessons can the UK learn from these electoral registration systems?

Sweden

Sweden[4] uses an automatic voter registration model. All persons who qualify to be included on the Swedish Tax Agency’s Population Register 30 days before the election day are automatically registered and mailed a polling card. In 2022[5], the voting age population of Sweden was 8.1 million, over 7.75 million people were registered to vote, and turnout was 84%.

Australia

Australia has compulsory voting for all eligible voters over the age of 18. Voters must register on the electoral roll within 8 weeks of becoming eligible and must update the electoral roll with any change of details e.g. address within 8 weeks of the change; a fine can be issued if this is not done. Canvasses also take place in Australia and various states have implemented systems of direct enrolment and direct update via “administrative data from other agencies [which] are used to add individuals to the roll and update their details”[6]. In 2022, the voting age population of Australia was 20.3 million, voter registration was over 17.2 million and the turnout was 89.74%[7].

United States of America

Same-day registration and motor-voter registration have seen a significant increase in the numbers of voter registrations. Between 1995-1996, Federal Election Commission[8] (FEC) found ‘motor-voter’ registration had succeeded in registering 13,722,000 voters, 33.1% of the total number of registration applications in the US.

In 2012[9], turnout rates in states with same-day registration were, on average, 9 percentage points higher than states without same-day registration (67% vs 58%). Overall, 1.5 million voters used same-day registration in 2012.

16 states and the District of Columbia have approved AVR and more states are expected to pass similar provisions[10].  Since implemented in 2016, Oregon has seen registration rates quadruple at DMV offices. In the first six months after AVR was implemented in Vermont in 2017, registration rates jumped 62 percent when compared to the first half of 2016.

How can existing public data and digital methods be better utilised to create a more joined-up electoral registration system?

The ERS believes that an effective way to utilise public data and digital methods is to introduce AVR and move to a centralised national register to streamline the availability of data. AVR would ensure that the register was more accurate and complete and facilitate a range of other election day modernisations. A UK wide electoral register would improve the fragmented individual local authority register approach.

Another option would be to give EROs access to reliable information from other public sources , such as DVLA, HMRC, HM Passport Office, DWP, Department of Education, and to maintain accurate and complete electoral registers.  They could access recent transactional data to identify potentially eligible electors and invite them to register or use data sources to target specific groups of under-registered electors. The Individual Electoral Registration Digital Service (IERDS) could be developed to act as a conduit for data from new data sources and pass this on to EROs.

What issues exist regarding cyber security, data and privacy, and how can these concerns be addressed?

ERS advocates for the removal of the open register. The sale of the open electoral register should be curtailed due to potential for misuse and privacy infringements. The data of people who are registered to vote should not be for commercial sale or turn a profit. To reduce the risk of data misuse the ERS supports the move to AVR with a closed register. The combination of AVR and an open register would increase opportunities for fraud and the undermining of privacy due to the possibility of data linkages between Personally Identifiable Information held on the systems (PII). Removing of the open register and moving to AVR with a closed register would mitigate these dangers.

Issues surrounding micro-targeting and misinformation campaigns have been highlighted under the current system[11]. If the open register remains, the introduction of safeguards to prohibit misuse of data should be considered.

What issues do electoral registration officers face in relation to electoral data, including access to and sharing of data?

EROs store a live electronic database of current registered citizens on their local Electoral Management Software (EMS).  It is estimated that there are 9 million unregistered citizens, work needs to be done to improve the completeness of the electoral register. There is also an issue with the number of duplicate registrations in the lead up to elections, ranging from 30-70% in 2017[12]. To facilitate the completeness, reduce duplicate applications and improve the security of the register, the register could be merged to a single national electoral register which is closed, this would improve usability and security of the dataset and allow access to the data for those with legitimate public interest.

In principle, ERS support data-sharing agreements where they assist with the accuracy and completeness of the register. Only data directly relevant to electoral registration should be covered under any sharing agreement. A principle of agreement of which body/authority is the data controller and/or processor must be established and be applicable across all data sharing agreements to ensure transparency and compliance with UK GDPR principles. Any persons who are included in the electoral roll are entitled to clear and accessible information on how their data is stored, processed and accessed.

What are the challenges presented by event-led registration, and what additional burdens does this place on local authorities?

In 2019, after the General Election was called more than 3 million people registered to vote (29^th Oct 2019 – 26^th Nov 2019), in the same period before the 2017 General Election the figure was just over 2.3 million[13]. This increased pressure on EROs who were dealing with upwards of 100,000 registration applications per day in 2019 in the run up to the election. To counteract this, more opportunities for registration should be available throughout the year and ‘look up’ tool should be implemented where voters can check whether they’re registered and if their details are correct (this may require a centralised database but could also be done at a local or national level rather than UK wide)[14].

Examples of opportunities for voter registration include the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) (1993) in the US. The Act provides voters the opportunity to register to vote at their county or government registration office, motor vehicle agency, at universities, schools, and hospitals. This process is often called ‘motor-voter’ registration. In the first election post-enactment of the NVRA, the Federal Election Commission[15] (FEC) found the ‘motor-voter’ registration had registered 13,722,000 voters, 33.1% of the total number of registration applications in the US between 1995-1996. The FEC noted that “States generally have had few problems implementing the NVRA’s motor voter provisions” believing this was due to training of officials. The UK could consider creating more opportunities for voters to register in day-to-day interactions with government.

Same-day registration is available in many states in the US with positive results. In 2012, average turnout rates in states with same-day registration were 9 percentage points higher than states without same-day registration (67% vs 58%). Overall, 1.5 million voters used same-day registration in 2012.  Demos[16] noted that same-day registration:

1. Increases voter turnout.
2. Eliminates arbitrary deadlines that curtail registration.
3. Assists geographically mobile, lower-income citizens, young voters and voters of colour.
4. Remedies inaccurate voter rolls.

Demos[17] also notes that states with same-day registration:

• Have fewer provisional ballots.
• Experience insignificant increases in costs or administrative difficulty.
• Have the benefit of enhanced citizen participation in democratic processes.
• Report very few problems with fraud.

How have the changes introduced by the Elections Act 2022 impacted on electoral registration officers? For example, has this introduced additional administrative burdens on EROs specifically, or local authorities more generally?

It is anticipated that with the introduction of the Elections Act 2022 that EROs will have an increased workload due to the production of Voter Authority Certificates for electors who do not have an accepted form of voter ID and Anonymous Elector’s Documents. The AEA[18] and the LGA[19] have noted that the Elections Act 2022, in particular the new voter ID requirements, will have a number of implications for Councils, including; a necessary review of polling stations, sourcing new polling venues, reviewing existing IT systems and ensuring readiness of the systems, facilitating training of staff, and creating and distributing localised awareness campaigns for the new voter ID requirements.

How best can Government support local authorities to alleviate additional burdens and improve accuracy and completeness of their registers?

EROs should be given access to reliable and trusted information from other public data sources to maintain accurate and complete electoral registers.  Sources of data might include: DVLA, HMRC, HM Passport Office, DWP, Department of Education and similar. EROs could access data to identify potentially eligible electors or use data sources to target specific groups of under-registered electors. The Individual Electoral Registration Digital Service (IERDS) could be developed to act as a conduit to receive recent transactional data from new data sources and pass this on to EROs.

This already happens in Australia, where the Federal Direct Enrolment and Update process enrols or updates citizens’ details on the electoral roll using information provided by the Electoral Commission from other agencies.

Have the Government’s recent reforms done enough to improve the annual canvass process, or are further changes required?

The ERS welcomes the introduction of IER and changes in the annual canvass, however these have not gone far enough.  The Electoral Commission[20] noted issues with the 2020 reforms, including;

• Households being allocated the ‘wrong route’ due to the data matching process and/or the lag between matching and canvassing. Nearly a fifth of responses from Route 1 households reported updates to elector details.
• Updates to electors’ details may not be reflected on the registers – 2.4 million households, one third of those allocated to Route 2, did not respond to the canvass.
• A decline in the registration of attainers likely due to the reduced communication with route 1 households. The number of registered attainers dropped by 28.7% relative to 2020.

To ensure the accuracy and completeness of the register are continuously improved further modernisations such as automatic or more automated registration should be implemented alongside a single national electoral register.

What are the barriers to eligible electors registering to vote?

IER puts the onus on the individual to register to vote, it is well documented that some groups are less likely to register to vote than others depending on age, ethnicity, social grade, and disability. Uberoi and Johnstone[21] undertook research for the House of Commons on Political disengagement in the UK, they found:

Age: Young people are less likely to be registered to vote than older people. This in part may be due to young people moving house frequently. The Electoral Commission[22] also found that “lower levels of engagement with politics and voting are also relevant factors”.

Ethnicity: Non-registration is higher among minority ethnic groups[23], 25% of first-generation migrants and 20% for second-generation migrants are not on the electoral roll; in comparison 10% of the White population are not registered to vote. Reasons for this include: false assumptions that they are not allowed to vote, insufficient proficiency in English and more general barriers to voting e.g. age, housing.

Social grade: People with lower DE grades are less likely to be on the electoral roll than those in higher DE grade. Housing tenure is strongly related to this barrier, the longer the tenure at the address the more likely a person is to be on the electoral roll therefore homeowners are more likely to be on the electoral roll than private renters. People with lower DE grades re less likely to be homeowners than those with higher DE grades.

Disability: According to the Electoral Commission[24] research, as of December 2018, people with a physical disability were more likely to be registered (92%) than those without a disability (82%) or those with a mental disability (83%). It is suggested that this is due to those with physical disabilities moving home less frequently than the general population, mobility is one of the key drivers of low registration.

Mencap research[25] found that 60% of people with learning disabilities who didn’t vote said it was because registering to vote was too difficult, however 70% would like to vote in the next election. The survey cites the experience of a voter who describes the registration process noting that the voter registration form was complicated, unclear, had too many boxes, used complex language and did not have enough room for them to write all their information which led to them feeling excluded.

Why are there so many inaccurate entries and duplications on the register? How can they be rectified in a cost-effective manner?

Under IER, electors sign up online and provide some information (date of birth, NI number), which is verified against DWP records. There is no direct link between the online registration service and electoral registers, so it’s not possible to automatically detect and prevent duplicate applications.

Inaccuracies and duplications in the electoral register happen as citizens are not able to check whether they are registered and/or if their details are correct. If the annual canvass misses them any discrepancies at the address are included in the register. To reduce the number of inaccuracies and duplicates, an online database could be introduced where people can check whether they are registered.

This would be helpful for electoral officials who are under pressure at election time with the volume of applications. The practical implementation is harder in the absence of a national, centralised register but a look-up tool can still be implemented without one.

According to the Electoral Commission, a look-up tool could be either voter-focused or ERO-focused:

• Voter-focused: either at the local authority or centralised/national/UK-wide, where voters can look up if they’re already registered.
• ERO-focused: This could be: 1. Completely decentralised (single, local register); 2. Separate registers, but other EROs can look up entries on all 372 registers; 3. Four national registers; 4. Single, UK wide register. In all options, a unique identifier for each elector would be required.

Look-up tools are already used in Australia and Ireland.

How can resources be better targeted to ensure better engagement and accessibility for certain demographics?

Academics[26] have highlighted that publishing data on a voter registration dashboard at ward level would be beneficial for campaigners working to increase voter registration. It would allow campaigners to target their efforts in under-represented areas.

Response by Thea Ridley-Castle,
Research and Policy Officer for the Electoral Reform Society.

Email: thea.ridley-castle@electoral-reform.org.uk

Available on Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (LUHC) Committee site.

References

[1] https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/our-views-and-research/our-research/accuracy-and-completeness-electoral-registers/2019-report-accuracy-and-completeness-2018-electoral-registers-great-britain

[2] https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/registering-missing-millions

[3] https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/changing-electoral-law/a-modern-electoral-register/modernising-electoral-registration-feasibility-studies

[4] https://www.norden.org/en/info-norden/right-vote-sweden

[5] https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/261/40

[6] Australian Electoral Commission, Direct Enrolment and Direct Update: The Australian Experience. 2012. Available at: https://www.aec.gov.au/About_AEC/research/files/direct.rtf

[7] https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/54/40

[8]  https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/The_Impact_of_the_National_Voter_Registration_Act_on_Federal_Elections_1995-1996.pdf

[9] https://www.demos.org/research/what-same-day-registration-where-it-available#footnote1_sg60fgk

[10] https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/automatic-voter-registration-summary

[11] Toby. S. James and Paul Bernal (2023) The UK Electoral Data Democratic Deficit: A vision for digital modernisation, Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust: York.

[12] https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/changing-electoral-law/a-modern-electoral-register/modernising-electoral-registration-feasibility-studies/electoral-registration-need-reform

[13] https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/nov/26/voter-registration-rise-boosts-labours-election-hopes

[14] https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/changing-electoral-law/a-modern-electoral-register/modernising-electoral-registration-feasibility-studies/better-detection-and-management-duplicate-registration-applications

[15] https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/The_Impact_of_the_National_Voter_Registration_Act_on_Federal_Elections_1995-1996.pdf

[16] https://www.demos.org/research/what-same-day-registration-where-it-available#footnote1_sg60fgk

[17] https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/EDR_factsheet.pdf

[18] https://www.aea-elections.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/AEA-letter-to-Andrew-Stephenson-MP-29-09-2022.pdf

[19] https://www.local.gov.uk/about/news/lga-statement-parliamentary-vote-plans-introduce-voter-id

[20] https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/our-views-and-research/our-research/electoral-registration-great-britain-2021#effectiveness-of-the-reformed-canvass

[21] Uberoi and Johnstone, “Political disengagement in the UK: Who is disengaged?,” House of Commons Library, 2022. Available at: https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7501/CBP-7501.pdf

[22] Electoral Commission, The December 2015 electoral registers in Great Britain, July 2016, p. 45-47

[23] Equality and Human Rights Commission, Is Britain Fairer? The state of equality and human rights 2015, October 2015; Anthony Heath, Stephen Fisher, Gemma Rosenblatt, David Sanders and Maria Sobolewska, The political integration of ethnic minorities in Britain, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 179

[24] The Electoral Commission, 2019 Report: Accuracy and completeness of the 2018 electoral registers in Great Britain, October 2019

[25] Mencap, ‘People with a learning disability’s passion for politics thwarted by system of excludes them,’ 8 October 2014. Available at: https://www.mencap.org.uk/press-release/people-learning-disabilitys-passion-politics-thwarted-system-excludes-them

[26] Toby. S. James and Paul Bernal (2023) The UK Electoral Data Democratic Deficit: A vision for digital modernisation, Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust: York.

Parliamentary Constituencies Bill (consideration of amendments) –Tuesday 10^th November.

What is the problem?

• The Parliamentary Constituencies Bill 2019-21 proposes using the electoral registers as the data source to draw parliamentary constituencies but this data is less likely to include the names of young people than older people, since young people are often not registered to vote.
• The problem has arisen partly because, since the introduction of Individual Electoral Registration (IER), the completeness of electoral registers has fallen among attainers (16 and 17-year olds who will reach electoral age within the life of the register).  There were 471,000 attainers on the registers in 2013, but this figure had fallen to 306,000 by 2019. Registration rates for eligible 16 and 17-year olds were estimated to be 25% in 2018 – a drop from 45% in 2015. In contrast, 94% of those aged 65+ were estimated to be registered.
• This low level of registration among attainers should be of deep concern to anyone with the best interests of democracy in the UK at heart. Without revision to the Bill, the electoral boundaries will systematically give less democratic representation to young citizens.

On 8 October, at Report Stage in the House of Lords, a cross-party amendment to the Bill (see appendix for full text of amendment and signatories) was passed, by 293 votes to 215. The amendment requires the government to bring forward proposals to improve the completeness of the electoral register, in relation to attainers.

Potential solutions outlined in this amendment

• The receipt of a National Insurance number (NiNo) from the Department of Work & Pensions (DWP) is an important recognition of an individual’s rights and responsibilities in the economic sphere. It is also has the potential to be a moment where an individual is made aware of their rights and responsibilities in the democratic sphere.³
• The cross-party House of Lords Select Committee on the Electoral Registration and Administration Act 2013, recommended piloting a system of automatic voter registration (AVR) for attainers.⁴
• This amendment describes how such a system of AVR for attainers could work, with the DWP sharing information with Electoral Registration Officers (EROs), meaning a much higher proportion of attainers would be registered than is currently the case.
• Another option, as outlined in the amendment, would be for the DWP to provide attainers with information on how to apply to join the electoral register, at the same time as communicating with them regarding the receipt of their NiNo.

Why the Parliamentary Constituencies Bill?

• The Parliamentary Constituencies Bill 2019-21 proposes using the electoral registers as the data source to draw parliamentary constituencies, as is standard for the boundary review process.  As described above, however, this data source is incomplete and disproportionately less likely to include the names of young people.
• It is important that constituency boundaries are based on data that are as complete and accurate as possible, reflecting the real number of electors in each area. These straightforward proposals would go some way to improving the completeness of the data that will be used to draw constituency boundaries.

Parliamentary Constituencies Bill (Report Stage) – AMENDMENT 16 (see appendix for full amendment and cross-party signatories). 

What is the problem?

• The Parliamentary Constituencies Bill 2019-21 proposes using the electoral registers as the data source to draw parliamentary constituencies but this data is less likely to include the names of young people than older people, since young people are often not registered to vote.
• The problem has arisen partly because, since the introduction of Individual Electoral Registration (IER), the completeness of electoral registers has fallen among attainers (16 and 17-year olds who will reach electoral age within the life of the register).[1] There were 471,000 attainers on the registers in 2013, but this figure had fallen to 306,000 by 2019. Registration rates for eligible 16 and 17-year olds were estimated to be 25% in 2018 – a drop from 45% in 2015. In contrast, 94% of those aged 65+ were estimated to be registered.[2]
• This low level of registration among attainers should be of deep concern to anyone with the best interests of democracy in the UK at heart. Without revision to the Bill, the electoral boundaries will systematically give less democratic representation to young citizens.

Potential solutions outlined in this amendment

• This cross-party amendment seeks to compel the government to bring forward proposals to improve the completeness of the electoral register, in relation to attainers.
• The receipt of a National Insurance number (NiNo) from the Department of Work & Pensions (DWP) is an important recognition of an individual’s rights and responsibilities in the economic sphere. It is also has the potential to be a moment where an individual is made aware of their rights and responsibilities in the democratic sphere.[3]
• The cross-party House of Lords Select Committee on the Electoral Registration and Administration Act 2013, recommended piloting a system of automatic voter registration (AVR) for attainers.[4]
• This amendment describes how such a system of AVR for attainers could work, with the DWP sharing information with Electoral Registration Officers (EROs), meaning a much higher proportion of attainers would be registered than is currently the case.
• Another option, as outlined in the amendment, would be for the DWP to provide attainers with information on how to apply to join the electoral register, at the same time as communicating with them regarding the receipt of their NiNo.

Why the Parliamentary Constituencies Bill?

• The Parliamentary Constituencies Bill 2019-21 proposes using the electoral registers as the data source to draw parliamentary constituencies, as is standard for the boundary review process. As described above, however, this data source is incomplete and disproportionately less likely to include the names of young people.
• It is important that constituency boundaries are based on data that are as complete and accurate as possible, reflecting the real number of electors in each area. These straightforward proposals would go some way to improving the completeness of the data that will be used to draw constituency boundaries.

Rebuttals to potential objections

Privacy

• Under the proposed amendment, attainers would be entered onto the full electoral register, which is strictly for electoral purposes, but not the open register (the ‘edited register’ in Northern Ireland) which is sold for commercial purposes.
• If automatic registration were adopted, detailed legislation could require the ERO to write to all attainers, informing them of the ERO’s intention to include them on the electoral register.
• Attainers could be informed by the ERO of their right to register anonymously and the ERO would have to wait a minimum of 28 days from the issuing of their communication to the attainer, before registering them.

Individual responsibility to register

• Automatic registration is sometimes opposed on the basis that it is an individual’s responsibility to ensure they are on the electoral register.
• The Electoral Reform Society is unconvinced of this argument against automatic registration in general. In relation to 15-16-year olds, who have no prior experience of the electoral system, there is a strong case that it should not be their responsibility to ensure they are on the electoral register. We do not expect this group of people to seek out the DWP and ask for a National Insurance number. Why should we expect them to seek out their ERO to be placed on the electoral register?
• If automatic registration for attainers were not adopted, the proposal for the DWP to include details of how to register to vote, when communicating with attainers regarding their NiNo, would at least ensure that the vast majority of attainers will have received such information.

Party political bias

• There would be no evident party political advantage as a result of improving the proportion of 16 and 17 year olds who are registered. Based on ONS population estimates, 16-17 year olds make up an identical average (mean) of 2.6% of the population aged 16+ in constituencies in England and Wales won by the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats at the 2019 general election.

Costs

• Electoral registration officers are currently facing significant financial pressures, which has led them to cut voter outreach work.[5] Being provided with information about eligible attainers will likely lead to cost savings since fewer resources would need to be spent encouraging them to register to vote.

Ian Simpson, Research Officer, Electoral Reform Society – for further information please contact ian.simpson@electoral-reform.org.uk

Toby James, Professor of Politics and Public Policy, University of East Anglia

Stuart Wilks-Heeg, Reader in  Politics, University of Liverpool

[1] James, T.S. (2020) Comparative Electoral Management, chapter 9.

[2] Electoral Commission (2019) Completeness in Britain.

[3] James, T.S. & Bernal, P. (2020) Is it time for automatic voter registration in the UK?.

[4] HL Paper 83 (2020).

[5] James, T.S. & Clark, A. (2020) ‘Delivering Electoral Integrity Under Pressure: Local Government, Electoral Administration and the 2016 EU Referendum in the UK‘,

Appendix

Amendment 16 to Parliamentary Constituencies Bill (House of Lords Report Stage)

After Clause 6

LORD SHUTT OF GREETLAND (LIBERAL DEMOCRAT)

LORD WILLS (LABOUR)

LORD JANVRIN (CROSSBENCH)

LORD LEXDEN (CONSERVATIVE)

Insert the following new Clause—

 “Improving completeness of electoral registers for purposes of boundary reviews etc.

(1) Within a year of this Act coming into force, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament proposals for improving the completeness of electoral registers for purposes of boundary reviews.

(2) The proposals in subsection (1) may include requirements for either—
(a) the Department for Work and Pensions to provide every registration officer with the name, address, date of birth and nationality of each individual in their district to whom they issue a National Insurance number ahead of their 16th birthday, and for registration officers to add to the full electoral registers those electors who they are satisfied are eligible for inclusion; or
(b) the Department for Work and Pensions to notify individuals of the criteria for eligibility to vote and of the process for making an application to join the register when they are issued with a new National Insurance number.”

Member’s explanatory statement

16 and 17 year olds are added to electoral registers for the purposes of boundary reviews, but many of them are not known to the registration officers. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to make proposals for improving the completeness of electoral registers and suggests two possible ways in which the issue of a National Insurance number could trigger the inclusion of 16 and 17 year olds.