While you might think that local councils are wholly funded by council tax, in fact, local government in England is funded by a combination of central government grants and local taxes.

What are the problems with local government funding?

There are three main problems with the way local councils in England are funded. First, funding is often short-term and uncertain, meaning that authorities cannot effectively plan for the long term and ensure the sustainability of their finances and the essential services they deliver. Secondly, it is fragmented across services and departments, and central government put a lot of restrictions on how it is used. Thirdly, councils often have to engage in competitive bidding for grants issued by central government, which may not be successful, placing an additional cost on councils trying to obtain funding.

The impact of austerity

On top of these issues, austerity completely reshaped local government finances, ‘shrinking the capacity of the local state, increasing inequality between local governments and exacerbating territorial injustice.’

The highly centralised system of national government in England, combined with weak local government, meant that austerity measures could be imposed from the centre onto local areas in England, unlike in the other parts of the UK. According to an analysis by the Institute for Government, since austerity began, spending on local government fell in England by 21 percent between 2010–11 and 2018–19. This is over ten percentage points more than in Scotland and Wales, which were able to prevent some of the worst cuts as they have a greater degree of autonomy over spending than councils in England.

The impact of the pandemic

Even before the pandemic began, councils had seen a significant reduction in core funding and were facing a 6.5 billion funding gap by 2024–2025. The covid-19 outbreak thus only served to expose the already precarious situation of local government finances, with the National Audit Office finding that, if the government had not provided emergency cash, there was the potential for system-wide financial failure. Some councils declared bankruptcy, while others had to ask the government for a bailout. Twenty-five councils were at acute or high risk of financial failure, with 92 at medium risk of insolvency. Because of cuts to local government finances, councils were less resilient and flexible in dealing with the impacts of the pandemic.

Current proposals for funding local government

In 2018–19, 50 percent of council funding came from central government grants, 31 percent from council tax, 18 percent from business rate revenues (collected locally but redistributed via a nationally-run system), and one percent from council reserves.

The reliance on central government funding, combined with the impact of austerity on local finances, means that local government funding in England is in need of reform. But the government seems to be continuing the top-down, centralised approach to local government funding, leaving councils with little say over the funding they receive.

Most of the government’s flagship levelling up policies, including the Towns and Levelling Up funds, allocate funding based on bids submitted by individual local areas. Central government retains full discretion to determine which projects are eligible and how funding will ultimately be allocated, rather than giving each area the autonomy to decide for itself how best to spend money to boost local growth.

The Towns Fund has already been subject to controversy due to the lack of transparency around the criteria used for determining the 100 towns which were to be invited to bid. The House of Commons Public Accounts Committee questioned the government’s approach in selecting the towns, stating that it was ‘not convinced by the rationales for selecting some towns and not others’, and has raised ‘concerns over the decisions being politically motivated’. A report from the National Audit Office had previously set out how, for some towns, ministers deviated from the recommendations of officials, and the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government confirmed that ministers applied ‘their own qualitative assessment of those towns and their eligibility for funding’.

Further, it emerged that the towns invited to apply were ‘disproportionately drawn from marginal Conservative-held constituencies, and that the scheme might therefore benefit the Conservatives in any future election.’ This is particularly concerning given the nature of Westminster’s First Past the Post voting system and the key role played by marginal seats, with elections won and lost on a handful of seats changing hands. Focusing investment on these areas is a clear example of ‘pork barrel politics’ and has the potential to influence election results, and thus who forms the government. Due to First Past the Post, who wins these marginal seats can manufacture a large majority for a single party on a plurality of the vote. Further, it contributes to the neglect of and underinvestment in areas considered to be ‘safe’ from an electoral standpoint and thus not ‘worthy’ of political attention or funding.

What can be done about local government funding?

Compared to other countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the UK has one of the most centralised local government funding systems, with little local autonomy and control over fiscal decisions around spending and taxation. For example, 30 percent of tax revenue is taken at the sub-national level in Germany, compared to under five percent in the UK, while spending by sub-national government is 2.5 times higher per capita in Germany than in the UK.

There is strong and growing consensus around the need to ensure fiscal autonomy for local government in England. In our new report, Democracy Made in England, we join the calls for financial and fiscal devolution to be among the powers available to English localities, depending on their need and capacity. This will allow areas to take on additional autonomy from central government and make long-term decisions for their specific area, while not precluding additional redistributive measures to ensure areas with lower revenue-raising capacity are not left behind.

We need to move away from Whitehall’s command and control approach to local government and ensure people and places are the heart of local decision-making.

Find out more about English local government and how it can be reformed, in the latest ERS report Democracy Made in England.

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Local government in England comes in many different formats, unitary, district and county councils all cover different parts of the country. In recent years, mayoral combined authorities have become an established part of the English constitutional set-up – if Greater London is included, 41 percent of England’s population (representing 43 percent of economic output but just 14 percent of land area) now lives in areas with some form of mayoral devolution deal.

Metro mayors themselves have come to increasing prominence in recent years, notably since the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic.Turnout increased in the 2021 combined authority mayoral elections, compared to the same contests in 2017. The Tees Valley election witnessed the most significant turnout change in 2021, with incumbent mayor Ben Houchen being re-elected with a 12.7 percentage point increase in turnout.

What are combined authorities?

Combined authorities (CAs) are formed by the coming together of two or more unitary authorities, which agree to a bespoke ‘devo deal’ with central government in order to obtain some devolved powers. There are now 10 combined authorities in England, nine of which have a directly elected ‘metro mayor’ (mayoral combined authorities or MCAs). The North East Combined Authority does not have an elected mayor.

Directly elected mayors are seen as key to the success of the combined authority model of devolution, as they can provide a single, clear point of accountability, while being supported by a cabinet made up of local authority leaders and representatives of local economic sectors. By speaking ‘with a single and democratically mandated voice’ for their local area, mayors are seen as offering visibility for their community at the national level. Their election via the Supplementary Vote helps prevent unpopular candidates being elected on a small share of the vote, as can happen under First Past the Post, thereby ensuring that these important executive roles can command the support of a broad range of voters.

Why were combined authorities established?

The impetus for the ‘devo deals’ and the creation of mayoral combined authorities can be found in the aftermath of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. In addition to promising further devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, then Prime Minister David Cameron announced that there would be a ‘wider civic engagement about how to improve governance in our United Kingdom, including how to empower our great cities.’

This policy was based upon a plethora of think tank reports published in 2014 and which, in turn, drew upon the 2012 independent report by Lord Heseltine on how to increase UK growth, which had proposed a fully unitary system of local government in England.

The first devolution deal, for the Greater Manchester Combined Authority, was announced in November 2014. Following the 2015 general election, the Conservative government set out its commitment ‘to building strong city regions led by elected mayors, building on the ground-breaking devolution deal with Greater Manchester in November 2014.’

To date, all devolution deals have initially been negotiated and agreed in separate, private, meetings between government teams and local authority leaders. After a deal was agreed and published, the local councils involved had to approve their participation in the deal (‘ratification’).

How does devolution work in combined authorities?

Devo deals typically consist of a ‘menu with specials’, with each metro mayor having different powers and budgets. Most deals include the devolution of powers around further education, business support, economic development, planning and land use, and local transport. In some cases, such as Greater Manchester, unique powers (the ‘specials’) are devolved as well, such as over housing and health.

Metro mayors make decisions about policy and spending alongside local authority leaders in their area, who may have different political standpoints or belong to different parties, and decisions must be signed off by a majority of council leaders. Metro mayors retain an effective veto over combined authority decisions in most areas, meaning their approval is needed to take a decision forward. Important decisions, such as on spending or local transport plans, can be rejected by a two-thirds majority of council leaders. Some decisions require unanimous approval from the mayor and CA members. This is unlike the situation in London, where the mayor can take decisions without reference to the boroughs.

Unlike arrangements in Scotland and Wales, and the London mayoralty, metro mayors are still a weak institution – they have limited powers and resources, lack meaningful control over funding and spending decisions, and cannot determine their own priorities where these diverge from the centre. But in spite of their few formal powers, mayors have sought to increase their clout in other ways. For example, they have taken on ‘orphan policies’, where no level of government has a clear duty to act, such as tackling homelessness or improving mental health provision. As shown during the coronavirus pandemic, mayors can also command attention from the national media, unlike other local government leaders.

Where next for metro mayors and combined authorities?

The government’s recently published levelling up white paper commits to extending and deepening devolution across England, including in mayoral combined authorities. The white paper makes it clear that the government’s preferred devolution model remains the mayoral one, with the highest level of devolved powers being available to areas with a single institution or county council and a directly elected mayor. A new MCA will be agreed with York and North Yorkshire, and existing MCAs will be expanded including in the North East, Greater Manchester and the West Midlands. The latter two will be able to access ‘trailblazer deals’ for further powers.

It is crucial that the targets set out in the levelling up white paper to extend and deepen devolution across England by 2030 are met. To date, progress on devolution has been very slow – almost 10 years after the first devolution deals were agreed, nowhere has yet the same powers as Greater Manchester.

Citizens themselves should also be much more involved in discussing the future of their communities, including around devolution and local government reform, as the ERS has long called for. Citizen involvement during the ‘devo deals’ negotiations was limited and this impacted public support for and legitimacy in these institutions.

Recent government proposals raise further concerns about the extent to which it is committed to ensuring local communities have a strong voice and representation. The Elections Bill currently making its way through parliament would change the method by which metro mayors, alongside local authority mayors and Police and Crime Commissioners, are elected from the Supplementary Vote to First Past the Post.

Scrapping the Supplementary Vote in favour of First Past the Post would be a step back for voters. The Supplementary Vote has been used for over 20 years and is an improvement on First Past the Post, which forces voters to vote tactically. Rather than making elections more accessible and enhancing participation, this addition to the Elections Bill would lead to voters having less of a say in our democratic processes.

Find out more about English local government and how it can be reformed, in the latest ERS report Democracy Made in England.

You can support the work like this by becoming a member of the Electoral Reform Society

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England’s local government can sometimes be quite confusing. The history of devolution within England is one of ad hoc, piecemeal, top-down reforms united in their lack of a clear vision. This has left different areas with different arrangements, although generally, the purpose is the same wherever you are.

Firstly, local councils provide for an additional layer of democracy to that available from central government. Local government ensures the political representation of citizens at the local level, it is publicly accountable for local decisions and the implementation of national ones, and it fosters local engagement. Second, local government is responsible for providing a variety of public services, such as social care, education, housing and planning, and waste collection.

Local government is a devolved matter in the UK, so it takes different forms across the country. In Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, there is a single layer of local government – with 11, 32 and 22 ‘unitary authorities’ respectively in each of these parts of the UK.

The landscape of local government in England is more fragmented and overlapping, with functions, powers and resources depending on the specific type of arrangement, and its shape has changed (and continues to do so) over the years.

There are three forms of sub-national government in England: local authorities, combined authorities, and London’s bespoke arrangements.

Local authorities in England

Currently, there are 333 local authorities in England, and these can be divided into two-tier and single-tier authorities:

• In two-tier areas, larger County councils cover multiple smaller District councils and these authorities share local government functions. County councils are responsible for social care and some aspects of transport and education (providing around 80 percent of services). District councils manage neighbourhood services, such as waste collection.
• In single-tier areas, one authority carries out all local government functions. Single-tier areas include: unitary authorities, London boroughs, metropolitan districts (effectively unitary authorities – the name is a relic of past organisational arrangements), and two unique authorities (City of London and Isles of Scilly). Around 62 percent of the population in England is covered by a single-tier authority.

Table 1: Principal Councils in England

Type of authority	Number of authorities
Two-tier
County councils	24
District councils	181
Single-tier
Unitary authorities	58
Metropolitan districts	36
London boroughs	32
City of London	1
Isles of Scilly	1
Total	333

Source: https://lgiu.org/local-government-facts-and-figures-england/

In both types of authorities, councillors are elected every four years using First Past the Post in wards that either elect one or multiple councillors each, with voters having as many votes as there are seats up for grabs. This can result in local councils that look nothing like the political make-up of the population that elected them.

The number of seats up for election can vary. In the majority of councils (68 percent), all council seats are elected at the same time. But, in 30 percent of councils, one-third of the councillors are elected every year, with the fourth year fallow. For voters, who may live in wards with three councillors, this would mean going to vote in three out of every four years. In two percent of councils, half of the seats are up for election every two years.

Both two-tier and single-tier types of local government are termed ‘principal councils’. Below this level, there are also around 10,000 ‘local’ councils, such as parish and town councils. All areas of England are also covered by a Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP), a voluntary body established in 2010–11 following the abolition of Regional Development Agencies, which coordinates economic development and growth policy in local areas. LEPs are not formally accountable to local authorities and thus to the electorate.

Combined authorities and London

In some areas, unitary authorities have joined together into a ‘combined authority’ with a directly elected mayor in order to access further powers from central government. There are now ten combined authorities (CAs) in England, nine of which have a directly elected ‘metro mayor’ (mayoral combined authorities or MCAs; the North East CA does not have an elected mayor). Mayors of combined authorities are not to be confused with elected mayors leading a single local authority, of which there are currently 15 in England. or for that matter, ceremonial mayors.

Devolution in Greater London is distinct from MCAs – the Greater London Authority, with a directly elected mayor and the London Assembly, was established following a referendum in 1998 and legislation in 1999.

Metro mayors and the mayor of London are elected using the Supplementary Vote, although the Elections Bill currently in parliament would change the electoral system used to elect mayors and Police and Crime Commissioners to First Past the Post (FPTP). Using the Supplementary Vote helps prevent unpopular candidates being elected on a small plurality of the vote, as can happen under FPTP, ensuring that these important executive roles can command the support of a broad range of voters.

Diversity in local government

There is quite a long way to go to ensure diversity in local government – indeed, until the election of Tracy Brabin as mayor of the West Yorkshire combined authority, all metro mayoral positions were occupied by men. Although demographic data on councillors are not officially collected, an LGA census of local authority councillors in 2018 found that almost two thirds (63%) of councillors were male, while 36 percent were female. Ethnic minority representation is also very low – a study by the University of Manchester found that only seven percent of local councillors in the UK come from an ethnic minority background, compared with 10 percent of MPs and 14 percent of the population.

Section 106 of the Equality Act 2010 would require political parties to publish diversity data on candidates standing for election to the House of Commons and devolved administrations, but is yet to be enacted.

The ERS has long called for section 106 to be enacted and to extend to local government, so that transparency about those standing for office at the local level is enhanced.

Devolution in England clearly remains very much unfinished business. You can find out more about English local government and how it can be reformed, in the latest ERS report Democracy Made in England.

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Earlier this week, the House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs (PACAC) select committee published the final report of its inquiry into the Elections Bill.

In a highly critical report, the influential committee heeded the calls made by regulators, academics and civil society organisations, including the ERS whose written and oral evidence were extensively cited in the report, for a comprehensive rethink of many aspects of the bill, and called on the government to pause the legislation until further research and consultation have been carried out.

The cross-party committee rebuked the bill’s failure to engage with the many long-standing recommendations to genuinely reform electoral law, arguing that it ‘risks adding further layers of complexity’ to the UK’s already voluminous and fragmented body of electoral law and urged the government to set out a timetable for wholesale reform.

PACAC expressed particular concern about the fact the bill received limited to no public consultation and that insufficient evidence was gathered on the more controversial elements of the bill, such as changes to the Electoral Commission and voter ID. It denounced the fact that several proposals, which will make significant changes to our electoral law, are not included on the face of the bill, but are to be implemented via secondary legislation following the bill’s passage and are thus likely to receive very little debate and scrutiny in parliament.

The committee was critical of several of the proposals contained within the Elections Bill which the ERS and many other experts and organisations have been campaigning against.

Voter ID

PACAC found that the introduction of mandatory photo ID at the polling station risks ‘upsetting the balance of our current electoral system, making it more difficult to vote and removing an element of the trust inherent in the current system’ and found that the research and evidence adduced by the government to support this proposal ‘has simply not been good enough.’

The committee urged the government not to proceed with its proposal, highlighting the concerns raised about the impact of such a policy on people from certain societal groups or those with protected characteristics. PACAC recommended that further research and consultation to be conducted on the impact of voter ID on these groups so as to secure greater agreement for the proposals.

Were voter ID to be rolled out, the committee recommended that analysis should be undertaken on its wider impact on voter participation, including gathering information on those who arrive at the polling station without ID and on those who are deterred from even turning out in the first place.

The Electoral Commission

As set out in a previous blog post, the Elections Bill contains proposals to amend the role of the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission and introduces a ‘Strategy and Policy Statement’ for the Electoral Commission, setting out the government’s priorities on electoral matters and principles under which the Commission is expected to operate. Although ostensibly aimed at enhancing parliamentary scrutiny and accountability, the proposals have been criticised as an attempt to curb the Commission’s independence.

While accepting the importance of ensuring that parliament can effectively scrutinise the work of the Electoral Commission, in its report PACAC concluded that the government failed to demonstrate that its proposed changes to the Electoral Commission are ‘both necessary and proportionate, and therefore risks undermining public confidence in the effective and independent regulation of the electoral system.’

The committee also bemoaned the lack of consultation and called on the government to remove the clauses in the Elections Bill relating to the Electoral Commission pending a formal public consultation on the proposals.

Political campaigning

As the ERS noted in its submission to PACAC, in relation to political expenditure, the committee highlighted the Elections Bill’s failure to engage with the many sensible recommendations made by the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL) on reforming election finance and urged the government to bring forward amendments that would implement these as the bill progresses through parliament.

On digital imprints, PACAC welcomed the extension of imprint disclosures to online election material, but – as the ERS called for in its evidence – recommended that their implementation be monitored and regularly reviewed ‘to prevent any unintended consequences or loopholes.’

Extension of First Past the Post

Finally, while it did not comment on the benefits and disadvantages of different voting systems, the committee was highly critical of the manner in which changes to the voting system for mayoral and Police and Crime Commissioner elections were included in the bill, concluding that ‘[m]aking changes such as this after the Bill has been introduced and debated at Second Reading is disrespectful to the House.’

A missed opportunity for urgent reform

The findings of the influential, cross-party Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee should serve as an additional warning to the government about the plans contained in the Elections Bill – and a chance for them to think again about these proposals.

Despite its stated ambitions, the bill does nothing to tackle the fundamental issues with our electoral law, missing a crucial opportunity for genuine reform. Far from improving our democracy, this confused mix of policies risks locking millions out and handing increased powers to ministers over our elections.

There has been little in the way of meaningful consultation on many of the most dangerous provisions in this bill, last-minute amendments also mean key bits of this legislation have yet to receive any proper scrutiny within parliament.

Ministers must take the findings of this report as an opportunity to pause and rethink on this dangerous legislation. Rather than rushing the Elections Bill through parliament, they should take heed of the many recommendations that have been made with regards to how we can genuinely improve and strengthen our electoral system, and ensure it is fit for the 21st century.

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The re-run of May’s Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) election in Wiltshire and Swindon takes place on the 19th August, after the winning candidate was disbarred due to a historical driving conviction. The original election had taken place as part of the third round of PCC elections in 38 police authority areas across England and Wales.

What are PCCs?

The role of Police and Crime Commissioners was created in 2011 with the aim of strengthening local accountability and giving the public a direct say on how their streets are policed. PCCs replaced police authorities and have taken the role of police governance, police oversight, and the commissioning of police services, putting them into the hands of elected officials.

In some areas, PCCs have also taken on the governance of the local fire and rescue service – in Essex, Staffordshire, Northamptonshire and West Mercia there are now ‘Police, Fire and Crime Commissioners’.

Since their introduction, there have been some concerns with the PCC model – first and foremost the poor public understanding of and engagement with PCCs.

How are PCCs elected?

The first-ever PCC elections were held in 2012 across England (except London) and Wales. Turnout was just 15.1 percent – the lowest recorded level of participation at a peacetime, non-local government election in the UK. Turnout slightly increased in the following rounds of elections, averaging at 25.2 percent in 2016 and 33.2 percent in 2021, although it is still much lower than the turnout of 67.3 percent recorded at the 2019 general election.

Police and Crime Commissioners are elected using the Supplementary Vote (SV) – a preferential voting system also used for mayoral elections in England. Elections take place every four years and PCCs can serve a maximum of two terms.

Under the Supplementary Vote, voters can express a first and second preference for their two preferred candidates, though they do not have to mark a second preference if they do not have one.

If a candidate obtains more than 50 percent of the vote, they are elected on the basis of first preferences alone. If no candidate obtains more than 50 percent of the vote, the two candidates with the most votes in the first round proceed to a second, ‘run-off’ round, while all other candidates are eliminated. In the run-off, the second preferences of voters whose first-choice candidate was eliminated, are reallocated. The candidate with the most votes at the end of the second round is declared the winner.

The Supplementary Vote means politicians need a wider base of support than under First Past the Post, with the winning candidate having 50 percent or more of votes in the second round.

Comparing electoral systems

In March this year, the Home Secretary announced that the voting system used in elections for Police and Crime Commissioners (along with that of combined authority mayors and the mayor of London) would be changed, through primary legislation, from the Supplementary Vote to First Past the Post (FPTP), on the grounds that this would supposedly provide ‘for strong and clear local accountability’.

Despite its limitations – e.g. not allowing voters to rank candidates all in order of preference, unlike the Alternative Vote – the Supplementary Vote is an improvement on First Past the Post. Under SV, first preference votes cast for the runner-up and second preferences for both remaining candidates are not ‘wasted’, as they affect who goes to the run-off and thus the final outcome of the election. Second preference votes cast for the eventual winner count towards electing that candidate. Fewer votes do not count at all towards the election under the Supplementary Vote.

To understand how SV can ensure more votes count in an election than FPTP, one can look at the total number of preferences that went to winning candidates and runners-up in the PCC elections, as well as how SV ensures that the winner has at least 50 percent of the vote in the second round. Of the 120 total PCC contests held to date, three were de facto FPTP contests (only two candidates stood) while 21 contests were won on the basis of first preferences alone. These and the Wiltshire contest that is being re-run are excluded from the analysis below, which includes the remaining 95 contests.

The table below aggregates first and second preference votes across the 95 PCC elections held under SV which were not won in the first round and which did not have only two candidates. As is shown, by allowing the transfer of second preferences, the eventual winner under SV has the support of a larger swathe of the electorate than they would have had under FPTP. The column on the far right shows the number of second preference votes cast for the remaining two candidates in the run-off which affect the second round of the election, with more voters’ preferences being taken into account than would be the case under FPTP (where voters can only vote for their preferred choice).

Type of election	First preferences for winner under SV/FPTP*	First and second preferences for winner under SV	Second preferences for remaining two candidates under SV
PCCs 2012	1,562,533/1,577,243	1,983,579	721,774
PCCs 2016	3,034,092	3,727,662	1,245,555
PCCs 2021	3,512,832/3,519,749	4,066,272	1,189,643

These figures relate solely to elections held under SV (thus excluding de facto FPTP contests) and exclude elections which were won on the basis of first preferences alone.

* Ten contests would have resulted in a different winner if they had been held under FPTP. First preferences for winners for elections which would have resulted in a different outcome under FPTP have two different totals, as the FPTP totals reflect the first preferences which would have gone to the different winner.

In addition to allowing voters to express two preferences, if they wish to, and to ensuring the winning candidate has broader support than under FPTP, the Supplementary Vote guarantees that the winning candidate receives over 50 percent of the vote in the second round. Unlike other transferable and preferential voting systems, this is far from perfect, as the winning candidate’s vote share at the end of the second round does not necessarily represent a majority of the overall vote share. But it is still an improvement on FPTP, where the winner only needs to receive one vote more than the runner-up and can win on a very small plurality of the vote.

The table below aggregates the average, lowest and highest vote shares under FPTP, on the basis of first preferences alone, and SV in the second round. While these figures are not directly comparable – given that, for FPTP, they refer to the winner’s share of the vote as a proportion of first preferences alone, whereas the SV figures relate to the winner’s share of the vote in the second round of the election only – under SV, the winning candidate can at least claim to have received a majority of first and second preference votes cast for the two remaining candidates in the run-off.

Type of election	Average vote share of winner under FPTP (first preferences)	Lowest/highest vote share of winner under FPTP (first preferences)	Average vote share of winner under SV (second round)	Lowest/highest vote share of winner under SV (second round)
PCCs 2012	36.4%	24.8%/48.4%	57.2%	51.3%/67.8%
PCCs 2016	38%	24.4%/49.9%	58.1%	50.5%/68.1%
PCCs 2021	43.6%	31.6%/49.97%	57.4%	51.0%/68.2%

As in the previous table, figures relate solely to elections held under SV (not de facto FPTP, when there are only two candidates) and exclude elections won on the basis of first preferences alone. For the 10 elections which would have had a different outcome under FPTP, the vote share of the FPTP (not SV) winner is used for the FPTP results (third column from the left).

While being far from perfect, the Supplementary Vote is an improvement on FPTP, where the winner only needs to receive one vote more than the runner-up and can win on a very small plurality of the vote. The Supplementary Vote means politicians need a wider base of support than First Past the Post and, given they must obtain at least 50 percent of votes in the second round, can claim a larger democratic mandate than under FPTP, where candidates often win on a small plurality of the vote. Indeed, SV is viewed as encouraging a more positive style of campaigning as candidates desire the second preferences of third parties.

Changing the Supplementary Vote to First Past the Post would be a backwards step – rather than providing ‘strong accountability’, as the Home Secretary stated, it would reduce voter choice and democratic representation.

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Earlier this month, the government published its long-awaited Elections Bill which makes changes to the administration and conduct of elections with the stated aim of ensuring that ‘UK elections remain secure, fair, modern, inclusive and transparent.’

The most significant change contained in the bill is the introduction of mandatory photo ID at the polling station, which we’ve discussed elsewhere. (For detailed information on the voter ID proposals, see our new in-depth briefing). This is a highly controversial policy, which has rightly been met with condemnation by many organisations and parliamentarians, and would see potentially millions of voters being disenfranchised at a general election.

But what other changes are there in the bill?

Administration and conduct of elections

In addition to the controversial voter ID plans, the Elections Bill includes other changes to the administration and conduct of elections.

The bill limits the period for which a person can apply for a postal vote to three years – once these have elapsed, a voter will have to re-apply. It also explicitly bans political campaigners from handling postal voting documents, by introducing a new criminal offence for this, and introduces new rules for the handing in of postal votes (e.g. limiting the number of postal votes an individual can hand in).

With regards to proxy voting, the bill limits the number of electors for whom a proxy can vote to four. The bill also simplifies and clarifies the electoral offence of undue influence, and introduces new requirements to enhance the accessibility of polling stations for voters with disabilities.

Overseas electors and EU citizens

Another significant change is the repeal of the 15-year limit on overseas voters’ right to vote in UK parliamentary elections, with additional measures around the process for registering as an overseas voter and declaring one’s connection to a UK constituency. Extending the franchise for our elections is a positive move but the government must carefully consider the risks of removing restrictions on overseas electors – the consequence of which could threaten the integrity of our elections by allowing foreign political donations to flood our system.

At the same time, the bill amends voting and candidacy rights in non-devolved elections for EU citizens who have arrived in the UK since 1 January 2021. Only citizens of EU nations that have a bilateral agreement with the UK on voting rights will be able to vote in these elections.

The Electoral Commission

The Elections Bill contains proposals to amend the role of the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission, the statutory body responsible for holding the Commission to account which – for the first time ever – now has a single party majority on it.

The bill introduces a ‘Strategy and Policy Statement’ for the Electoral Commission, setting out the government’s priorities on electoral matters and principles under which the Commission is expected to operate, to be prepared by the Secretary of State and approved by parliament. The Speaker’s Committee will measure the Commission’s performance against the statement and hold it out accountable.

This controversial proposal has been criticised as an attempt to impinge upon the Commission’s independence, with the Commission itself stated that the proposal would ‘place a fetter on the Commission which would limit its activity’.

The bill also proposes to allow the Minister for the Constitution to attend the Speaker’s Committee meetings, and expressly removes the potential for the Commission to bring criminal prosecutions against those who break electoral law relating to parties and campaigners.

Regulation of election finance

The Elections Bill introduces five new measures around the regulation of expenditure, as has been highlighted in a previous blog post:

1. A requirement for new political parties to declare assets and liabilities over £500 when they register with the Electoral Commission.
2. A ban on simultaneously registering as a political party and a third party.
3. A restriction of third-party campaigning, with only third parties registered with the Commission being able to campaign during regulated periods, regardless of how much they spend.
4. Changes to third-party campaigner registration, with third parties spending over £10,000 being required to register to the Electoral Commission, to adhere to existing transparency requirements, and to indicate they are UK-based.
5. Restrictions on joint campaigning/spending between political parties and third parties

The bill also changes the rules around notional spending (services or goods that are transferred or given to candidates, for free or at a discount) for candidates and election agents

Preventing candidate intimidation

The bill introduces a new penalty for anyone found guilty of intimidating candidates, campaigners or elected representatives, who could be banned from standing for elected office for five years.

Imprints for online political material

Finally, the bill extends the requirement for election material to include an imprint (stating who promoted and paid for content) to online political ads – a recommendation first made by the Electoral Commission in 2003 and long advocated by many.

A missed opportunity

The Elections Bill is a significant piece of legislation which, in some areas, will make considerable controversial changes to the conduct and administration of our elections, including forcing voters to have to prove who they are in order to vote by presenting photo ID at the polling station. Despite its stated ambitions, however, the bill does not tackle the fundamental issues with our electoral law and still leaves open the possibility for loopholes to be exploited.

Repeated calls have been made over the years, not just by the ERS and other civil society organisations and academics, but by the Law Commission and, most recently, the Committee on Standards in Public Life – to name but a few – to consolidate, simplify and modernise electoral law.

We can’t continue tinkering around the edges – there’s no point in complicating our Victorian election rules even further with new requirements when it is the foundations themselves than need rebuilding. Rather than rushing the Elections Bill through parliament, the government must take heed of the many recommendations that have been made with regards to our election law and ensure it is fit for the 21^st century.

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Earlier this month, buried amidst the many reactions to the government’s Elections Bill, the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL) published its report on regulating election finance, following a year-long inquiry to which we gave evidence.

Despite not receiving as much attention as the Elections Bill, this report makes a series of significant recommendations – many of which the ERS has been calling for a long time – which, if implemented, would genuinely update our election finance rules, and would close many of the loopholes in our current system. Here we outline some of the report’s main recommendations.

Preventing foreign interference

The CSPL calls for a series of measures to be put in place to prevent foreign interference in UK elections, by ensuring donors are based in the UK. These include:

• Clarifying that, to be permissible, donors must be individuals on a UK electoral register.
• Ensuring that donations from companies based in the UK do not exceed their net profits after tax for activities generated in the UK.
• Banning foreign organisations or individuals from buying campaign advertising in the UK.

Enhancing transparency of donations and spending

The report recommends parties and campaigners to have appropriate procedures in place to check the true source of donations. Unincorporated associations (UAs) that meet the threshold for registering with the Electoral Commission, should conduct permissibility checks on relevant donations (i.e. money intended for political activity). There should be greater transparency around political gifts made to UAs. With regards to spending, the CSPL believes that reporting deadlines for parties and campaigners should be shortened, and that their expenditure published more promptly, so as to enhance transparency for and allow scrutiny by the public, journalists and academics.

Meaningful information on digital campaigning

As we’ve long called for, the CSPL recommends that parties and campaigners should be required to provide more detailed invoices and a breakdown of their digital spend to the Electoral Commission, including information on how online political ads were targeted. Crucially this should include which parts of the country ads were targeted in – a vital change given the broken First Past the Post system, which would close the loophole whereby parties can spend heavily in marginal seats, while reporting spending at the national level. It also recommends that the government should legislate to require social media platforms to create advert libraries, which should have information on amount spent, who paid for the advert, and to whom it was targeted (including information about the target audience).

Third party campaigning

As highlighted in our Democracy in the Dark report, third party campaigning increased significantly in recent years, especially during the 2019 general election. Unsurprisingly, the CSPL makes a series of recommendations on how better to regulate it, including requiring third parties to disclose more information when registering with the Electoral Commission – such as a brief summary of the campaign’s purpose, its geographical location, its web address, and whether it is part of a join campaign – so as to increase information around what can be opaque campaigns.

The Electoral Commission

It is in relation to the Electoral Commission, its functions, and powers that the CSPL makes some of its most significant interventions. Recognising the important role the Commission plays in overseeing elections and referendums, regulating political finance, and ensuring public confidence, the CSPL’s recommendations in this regard echo many of our own.

The CSPL argues that the Commission should be given the powers to obtain information outside of an investigation and to share information with other public agencies. It calls for an increase in the maximum fine the Commission can levy to four percent of a campaign’s total spend, or £500,000, whichever is higher. Finally, the Commission’s regulatory powers should be expanded so that it can investigate and sanction candidates for breaking the rules – because of our outdated and disjointed system of political finance, this currently falls under the remit of the police.

Improving the integrity of our elections

The CSPL report highlights many of the vulnerabilities in the current system and rightly calls for stronger regulation and enforcement of campaigns and underlines the important role of the Electoral Commission in preventing and tackling wrongdoing. If the government really wants to improve the integrity of our elections, they should consider the findings of the CSPL report and use its recommendations as a blueprint for how to properly make our election laws fit for purpose.

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Debates about the future of the union and devolution to the UK’s nations and regions continue to dominate the constitutional sphere, as we have set out before, with the results of the May 2021 elections throwing into sharp relief not only the role of the devolved governments, but also that of metro mayors and local leaders as important players in UK territorial politics.

But less attention has been paid among the broader commentariat to the role that Westminster and Whitehall themselves play within the UK’s constitutional set-up, and how they approach issues of territorial management. The unreformed nature of the central British state and how it has struggled to adapt to the constitutional changes that have taken place over the past few decades are not being addressed.

There are some notable exceptions. For example, the long-awaited review of UK government union capability undertaken by Lord Dunlop, published finally in March. Dunlop highlighted the scant attention paid to the implications of devolution on the way the union runs noting that ‘the focus has not been on the machinery and arrangements which enable the UK Government to discharge sensitively its own unique duties to people across all parts of the country, and to work constructively with devolved governments where responsibilities overlap.’

A report commissioned by the Constitution Society on the British state and devolution similarly pointed out how the state has found it difficult to ‘internalise the implications and realities of devolved governance’ and how there is an ‘ingrained disinclination’ to properly engage in a meaningful way with its territories, with Whitehall displaying ignorance and indifference towards devolution and politics outside of England.

Further, the House of Lords Constitution Committee has recently launched an inquiry into the future governance of the UK and is likely to consider issues of territorial politics.

In addition to looking at what can and should be done in the nations, regions, and localities of the UK, we need to make sure that we also talk about Westminster just as much and address the deficiencies inherent in its set-up.

Westminster’s disinclination to engage

The current balance of powers within the UK revolves around Westminster, with its centralising and power-hoarding structures and culture. The current First Past the Post voting system lies at the heart of much of Westminster’s centralising approach and culture. Being granted unfettered power on a plurality of the vote means there is little incentive for government to form consensus and collaborate with other parties and legislatures, to formulate a long-term vision, and share power in a more balanced and equitable manner.

Despite devolution across the UK (albeit in a much more limited form in England), this centralisation and disinclination to genuinely share power permeate the British state’s relationships with the UK’s territories, acting as a barrier to meaningful and long-term collaboration, trust and parity of esteem. Rather than improving over the years, as the devolution settlements have become more embedded, the central state’s approach, particularly as articulated by the current government, has been one of ‘assertive and muscular style of unionism’, focused on strengthening the profile and influence of the centre in the devolved territories.

Westminster’s long-standing failures at governance

Successive governments’ approach to devolution and territorial management has been to ‘devolve and forget’ – without setting out a clear, long-term and comprehensive constitutional vision and purpose, which takes into account the UK as a whole and how its constituent parts (including England as separate from the UK) interact with each other and with the central state.

Relations between the UK’s governments and parliaments continue to be informal, thus allowing the UK to preserve Westminster’s parliamentary sovereignty and the legitimacy and authority of the constitution, while letting the devolved legislatures enjoy de facto autonomy in their areas of competence.

Mechanisms for intergovernmental and interparliamentary discussion and dispute resolution have not been properly developed over the years, with consequences for the effectiveness of governance arrangements among the different territories of the UK. Current systems are falling short, and do not offer a genuine voice to the constituent parts of the UK in relation to the UK government, which continues to dominate such forums.

Reforming Westminster

Some proposals have already been made for reforming Westminster’s approach to the union, including by Lord Dunlop, who recommended, among other things, the creation of a new Secretary of State for Intergovernmental and Constitutional Affairs as a new senior Cabinet position to ensure that the union and devolution are at the heart of the UK government and policy-making.

The All-Party Parliamentary Group on Devolution also made suggestions on how to improve relations between the centre and localities, calling for a culture shift in Whitehall so that local government is granted parity of esteem.

The government itself appears to be re-engaging with its commitments to strengthening the union, improving its relationships with the devolved administrations, and ‘levelling up’ the nations and regions of the UK, having made a series of new appointments to this effect and published an update of its review of intergovernmental relations in the past few months.

Proposals to reform the culture and approach of the British state to adapt to the new constitutional landscape are important and urgent, as both the Brexit and pandemic experiences have highlighted. But we need to go much further.

Moving to a proportional voting system would tackle Westminster’s over-centralisation and foster a more stable balance of powers between the central state and the devolved areas. Reform of the second chamber as a senate of the nations and regions would strengthen and enhance the UK’s governance arrangements, recognising the UK as it is, not as a pre-devolution, unitary state, and serving as a forum in which issues of territorial politics could be raised and discussed.

In addition to such institutional changes, powers should be dispersed more widely across and within the constituent parts of the UK, especially within England, and brought as close as possible to people and communities, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, allowing for local policy-making and citizen involvement through deliberative democratic processes.

Tackling both economic and democratic inequality should be part of the agenda for any government committed to ‘levelling up’. While the government have talked much about the former, it’s now time they made clear how they plan to address the latter too.

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Buried amidst last week’s fall-out from the Queen’s Speech and the elections was the fourth report of the Lord Speaker’s Committee on the Size of the House. The committee, established in 2016 by Lord Fowler, until recently Speaker of the House of Lords, and chaired by Lord Burns, was tasked with identifying practical and politically viable options to reduce the size of the House.

The Burns report

In its report of October 2017, the committee recommended five key reforms:

1. The number of peers should be capped at 600;
2. A two out, one in system should be adopted voluntarily;
3. Each group in the Lords should achieve the same reduction as a percentage of their membership;
4. 15-year non-renewable fixed term limits should be introduced for peers;
5. Any political appointments should be linked to election results.

These recommendations were designed to be incremental and achievable without legislation – meaning they would only be met through voluntary action by parties and Lords groupings, and restraint on behalf of the prime minister in the number of new appointments. The committee also specifically chose not to consider the issue of hereditary peers in its original report.

Where are we now?

Since 2017, the committee has reported almost every year on the progress made in achieving the targets it set. In its latest report, the committee found that departures from the House of Lords are on track with its original recommendations – 119 members have left the Lords, matching exactly the benchmark for this stage. Compared with the benchmark, slightly fewer Conservative and Liberal Democrat peers left the House, while slightly more Labour and Crossbenchers did, though the differences are not particularly significant.

Departures from the House of Lords and comparison with benchmarks in the original 2017 report

Group	Retirements	Deaths	Total departures since 8 June 2017	Benchmark for this stage	Difference actual departures/benchmark
Con	25	10	35	38	-3
Lab	11	21	32	30	+2
LD	5	5	10	14	-4
XB	24	8	32	28	+4
Other	7	3	10	9 (nominal)	+1
Total	72	47	119	119

 

But the committee found that recent appointments to the House have ‘undone the progress’ made by the Lords and the previous Prime Minister in reducing its size. There have been 113 new appointments in the same period, nearly double the committee’s recommended limit of 60, partly because ‘the current Prime Minister has not shown the same restraint as his predecessor.’ This has led the committee to ‘fear that the sheer rate of new appointments presages a return to the inexorable upward path in the size of the House.’ Indeed, we have already seen the House swell to over 800 peers earlier this year.

Appointments/elections to the House of Lords and comparison with benchmarks in the original 2017 report

Group	Appointments/elections	Benchmark for this stage	Difference actual entries/benchmark
Con	55	22	+33
Lab	16	17	-1
LD	0	2	-2
XB	29	14	+15
Other	13	5	+8
Total	113	60	+73

NB: these figures do not include the appointments made in the ‘legacy list’ of May 2018. For more see the committee’s report.

While the differences in departures from the House did not differ significantly among groups, there are considerable differences between appointments/elections to the House and the benchmark set for this stage by the committee. Considerably more Conservative peers entered the House than set out in the benchmark (an additional 33 Conservative peers) and an extra 15 Crossbench peers and eight others entered the House than had been envisioned in the committee’s 2017 report. Indeed, the committee notes its concern ‘that party nominations over the four years have been overwhelmingly Conservative and have fallen well short of our proposal for sharing appointments to reflect the result of General Elections.’

The committee also flag how Crossbenchers have been increasingly appointed by the Prime Minister in recent years, rather than the House of Lords Appointments Commission (HOLAC), and express concern at how the current Prime Minister ‘has taken this a step further a new practice of appointing “non-affiliated” peers, who tend to be political figures (and thus unsuitable for the Crossbenches) who have for whatever reason had a parting of ways with their party.’

Where next?

In stark contrast to its previous recommendations, designed to be implemented without legislation over a 10+ year horizon, the Speaker’s committee concluded in its latest report that the voluntary approach suggested thus far is no longer suitable, as it is too vulnerable to political events, such as general elections and changes of prime minister, which lead to new peers being appointed.

The committee’s priority is now for the binding cap to be implemented and thus reduce the number of peers to 600 by the end of this parliament. Once this is achieved, party leaders will be incentivised to only nominate members who will be ‘working peers’ (perhaps allowing for the introduction of peerages that do not entail membership of the House, but would allow for individuals to receive an honour).

Further, the committee recommended that there should be a limit of 10 prime ministerial appointments to the Crossbenches every five years (rather than every parliament) and that HOLAC should be the primary source of nominations to the Crossbenches.

Finally and most significantly given its previous neglect of this issue, the committee recommended that hereditary peer by-elections be stopped, while acknowledging this would require legislation, and highlighted how the ‘preponderance’ of Conservative and Crossbench peers amongst hereditaries ‘distorts the balance of the House’. A situation which would be exacerbated in a smaller House of 600 members.

But while the committee is optimistic about ‘small, incremental and consensual changes’ being the ‘surest route to success’, experience seems to tell us that this will be insufficient to achieving either short- or long-term change. As I have argued before, piecemeal, incremental reform of the House of Lords is no longer an option – the voluntary approach has failed, as the committee itself has admitted. What is needed now is decisive action, legislation and, most importantly, cross-party political willingness to address not only the issues of the size of the House of Lords and the anachronistic hereditary peer by-elections, but ultimately its democratic legitimacy and accountability.

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This week’s Queen’s Speech confirmed that the government would be pushing ahead with the Electoral Integrity Bill.

As we’ve outlined before, the bill would require voters to present photo identification at the polling station in order to vote – a costly and undemocratic plan, which could potentially see millions of ordinary people locked out of the ballot box at election time, and which has been widely condemned by figures ranging from leading Conservative David Davis MP and former Scottish Conservative leader Ruth Davidson, as well as almost all opposition parties.

The government appears intent on pursuing this unfair and discriminatory policy, but its own commissioned research, published this week, raises serious concerns about how voter ID will make it much harder for people to vote.

Who has photo ID?

The government’s commissioned report found that 91 percent of people had in-date, recognisable photo ID, meaning that almost one in 10 people would not be able to vote. If expired, yet still recognisable, ID were to be allowed, four percent of people would not be able to vote – this translates to roughly 2.1 million people who would risk not being able to vote at a general election.

If we look at specific demographics in the government-commissioned research, we find that certain groups are less likely to hold ID. For example, older voters (aged 85+) were less likely to have ID that was recognisable (91% compared to 95%-98% for those in younger age groups). Those with severely limiting disabilities, the unemployed, people without qualifications, and those who had never voted before were all less likely to hold any form of photo ID.

What about the ‘free’ Voter Authority Certificate?

The government reiterated this week its commitment that citizens could apply for a free electoral identity card if they do not hold appropriate photo ID. But having to apply for free ID is yet another barrier to exercising one’s democratic rights, particularly for those who might find it hard to complete forms or costly to go to get passport-quality photos taken.

When asked about whether they would apply for a free elector card, 56 percent of respondents to the government-commissioned survey said they would be unlikely or very unlikely to apply for this. Among respondents with no photo ID, 42 percent said they would be unlikely or very unlikely for this, leading the researchers to conclude that this ‘would suggest that close to half of those without photo ID would not seek to apply for the Voter Card, and therefore be at risk of ending up without photo ID.’

A damaging impact on democratic participation

The research commissioned by the government also asked respondents about their likelihood to vote and ease of voting if ID were to be introduced. It found that over a quarter (27%) of those without any form of photo ID and a fifth (19%) of those with not recognisable photo ID would be less likely to vote if they had to present photo ID. This compares to four percent of those holding recognisable photo ID.

Overall, five percent of respondents said that having to show ID would make voting at a polling station difficult, with three percent of these saying it would be very difficult. But almost four in 10 of those without any photo ID said they believed the requirement for photo ID would make voting more difficult, with a quarter (25%) of those with unrecognisable ID stating the same.

Voting in the UK is safe and secure, as the government itself recognises. That means requiring photo ID to vote risk undermining the principles of fair and equal participation, principles that have been at the heart of British democracy since the adoption of universal, equal suffrage in 1928.

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